1. SUMMARY: THE MISSION HAS LEARNED FROM RELIABLE
EC SOURCES THAT THE MONETARY COMMITTEE DISCUSSED THE
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SEVERAL SOLUTIONS
FOR USING GOLD IN INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS. WHILE THE
COMMITTEE DREW NO CONCLUSIONS, THE GROUP SEEMED TO
RULE OUT THE FIXINGOF A NEW GOLD PRICE AND GAVE CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT TO THE SOLUTION INVOLVING IMF
LOANS AGAINST GOLD AS COLLATERAL. THE COMMITTEE
WILL TRY TO NARROW DOWN THE OPTIONS FURTHER AT ITS
NEXT MEETING APRIL 4-5, AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSSION,
THE COMMITTEE NOTED THAT THE RECYCLING PROBLEM WAS
NO LONGER URGENT BUT THAT IT SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE
STUDIED QUIETLY. END SUMMARY.
2. MOST OF THE MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO GOLD. THE
DISCUSSIONS CENTERED AROUND THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM
OF HOW THE COMMUNITY COULD USE GOLD IN THE MOST
ADVANTAGEOUS WAY IN MAKEING SETTLEMENTS BOTH WITHIN
THE COMMUNITY AND BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND THE
OUTSIDE WORLD. IT WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT ANY
SOLUTION SHOULD BE AS WIDE AS POSSIBLE GEOGRAPHICALLY
AND THAT A PURELY REGIONAL APPROACH WOULD BE OF LITTLE
USE IN ENABLING THE COMMUNITY TO PAY EXTERNAL DEBTS
ARISING FROM THE HIGHER COST OF OIL IMPORTS.
3. ONE POSSIBLILITY MENTIONED WAS THE SALE OF GOLD ON THE
FREE MARKET. THIS SOLUTION WAS JUDGED UNSATISFACTORY
TO CENTRAL BANKS DUE TO THE NARROWNESS OF THE MARKET
AND, THUS, THE EFFECT THAT SUCH SALES WOULD HAVE ON THE
GOLD PRICE. THE COMMUNITY ALSO CONSIDERED DIRECT
CENTRAL BANK GOLD TRANSACTIONS AT MARKET-RELATED
PRICES. IT WAS NOTED THAT SUCH TRANSACTIONS WOULD
BE CONTRARY TO GHE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE
IMF, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT JUDGED A SERIOUS PROBLEM
SINCE OTHER ARTICLES OF THE IMF ARE CURRENTLY BEING
VIOLATED. THE VIEW WAS EXPRESSED THAT THIS PROBLEM
COULD BE OVERCOME THROUGH A POLICY STATEMENT BY THE
IMF RESULTING IN DE FACTO SUSPENSION OF ARTICLE IV,
SECTION 2.
4. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT CENTRAL BANKS WOULD BE
UNWILLING TO BUY OR SELL GOLD ON THE FREE MARKET,
ANOTHER OPTION CONSIDERED WAS THE USE OF GOLD AS
COLLATERAL FOR LOANS GRANTED BY THE IMF. COUNTRIES
DEPOSITING GOLD WITH THE IMF WORLD BE ISSUED A COUNTER-
PART IN SDRS. IT WAS NOTED THAT SUCH A SOLOUTION WOULD
REQUIRE A DECISION ON THE VALUATION AND INTEREST RATE OF THE SDR. ON BALANCE, THIS OPTION WAS JEDGED THE
BEST OF THOSE CONSIDRED.
5. A VARIATION ON THE IMF OPTION WOULD BE THE
ISSUANCE BY THE EUROPEAN MONETARY COOPERATION FUND OF
EUROPEAN UNITS OF ACCOUNT AGAINST GOLD DEPOSITS (1 UAC
EQUALS $1.2063). ANY COUNTRY WISHING TO COULD DEPOSIT
GOLD WITH THE FUND. THIS OPTION, HOWEVER, WOULD IMPLY
MAJOR DECISIONS ABOUT RESERVE POOLING WITHIN THE
COMMUNITY AS WELL AS THE ROLE AND VALUATION OF THE UNIT
OF ACCOUNT, WHICH IS CURRENTLY MERELY AN ACCOUNTING
DEVICE. WHAT WOULD BE THE UAC'S VALVUE IN RELATION TO
GOLD AND OTHER CURRENCIES? WOULD THE UAC BECOME A
RESERVE CURRENCY? ASSUMING THE FUND COULD ISSUE UACS
AGAINST GOLD ONLY, WOULD IT HAVE TO SELL GOLD ON THE
FREE MARKET IF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY WAS IN DEFICIT?
THE COMMITTEE GENERALLY THOUGHT THIS OPTION LESS
ATTRACTIVE THAN THE ONE INVOLVING THE IMF.
6. ANOTHER POSSIBLITY DISCUSSED WAS AGREEMENT BY
CENTRAL BANKS TO ABSTAIN FROM SELLING GOLD BELOW A
CERTAIN PRICE OR PURCHASING IT ABOVE A CERTAIN PRICE.
BETWEEN THE TWO PRICES. GOLD WOULD FLUCTUATE ACCORDING
TO MARKET FORCES. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT BY ALLOWING USE OF
GOLD IN TRANSACTIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES WITHOUT ITS
USE BEIG OBLIGATORY IN INTRA-EC PAYMENTS--PRESUMABLY
ITS FLUCTUTATING VALUE WOULD MAKE IT AN UNSATISFACTORY
MEANS OF SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE EC, THOUGH THIS POINT
IS UNCLEAR. INTRA-COMMUNITY SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE IN
DOLLARS, AND THE DOLLAR WOULD AGAIN BECOME THE INTER-
VENTION CURRENCY. COUNTRIIS WITH FLOATING CURRENCIES
WOULD THUS BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EC'S MONETARY
ARRANGEMENTS WITHOUT THE OBLIGATION TO SETTLE IN GOLD
OR GOLD-RELATED ASSETS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE
COMMITTEE FULLY RECOGNIZED THAT THIS OPTION RAISED THE
QUESTION OF THE NEED FOR OBLIGATORY INTERVENTION TO
KEEP GOLD WITHIN THE AGREED MARGIN. THERE WOULD HAVE TO
BE RUELES FOR SUCH INTERVENTION, AND THESE WOULD HAVE TO
BE KEPT SECRET. AT THE LIMIT TTHIS OPTION WOULD
APPROXIMATE RESTORATION OF THE GOLD POOL AND A FIXED
PRICE FOR GOLD, BOTH OF WHICH WERE RULED OUT.
7. THE ATTITUDES OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES WERE ALONG
FAMILIAR LINES. MOST INTERESTED IN FIINDING A SOLUTIION
WERE FRANCE AND ITALY, BELGIUM TO A LESSER EXTENT, WITH
DENMARK MILDLY INTERESTED. THE GERMANS INDICATED GENERAL
RELUCTANCE TO CEDE DOLLARS FOR GOLD. OUR SOURCES SAID
THE FRG, WITH NO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS AT PRESENT,
WAS PROBABLY WORRIED ABOUT THE INFLATIONARY EFFECT OF A
GENERALIZED REVALUATION OF WORLD GOLD RESERVES. THE
GERMANS ALSO MIGHT NOT WISH TO BE OBLIGED TO BUY GOLD
UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE THEY
HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT ITS LONG-TERM VALUE. ACCORDING TO OUR
SOURCES, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE A BROAD EC
ARRANGEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT.
8. THE OPTIONS DISCUSSED BY THE MONETARY COMMITTEE WILL
BE FURTHER NARROWED DOWN FOR THE COMMITTEE'S NEXT MEETING
APRIL 4-5. IN THE MEANTIME, THE COMMITTEE EXPECTS THE
DISCUSSIONS TO BE PRUSED AT THE WORKING LEVEL WITH THE
IMF.
9. RECYCLING. THE COMMITTEE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY THE QUES-
TION OF RECYCLING FUNDS ACCUMLATED BY OIL PRODUCERS.
IT WAS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS NO LONGER
URGENT--PRIMARILY BECAUSE SOME COUNTRIES HAD ALREADY
HELPED THEMSELVES IN THE MARKET, WHICH SO FAR HAD STOOD
THE TEST. IT WAS ALSO NOTIED THAT BANKS, THROUGH THEIR
INFORMAL CONTACTS, HAD ARRANGED IN PRACTICE A QUEUING UP
OF BORROWERS, SO THAT RATES HAD REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE.
FOR CONTINGENCY PRUPOSES, HOWEVER, THE COMMITTEE AGREED
THAT SOME SORT OF EUROPEAN ARRANGEMENT INVOLVING BORROWING
VIA THE MONETARY CO
E E E E E E E E
Source: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974ECBRU01531_b.html
Summary: Timeline overview
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