ARAB LEAGUE CALLS MEETING TO DISCUSS ARAB RESERVES
1. TEXT OF U.S. PAPER ON SUBJECT CIRCULATED TO C-20
DEPUTIES JULY 17, 1973 IS REPRODUCED BELOW. YOU SHOULD AS-
SURE YOURSELF THAT APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF HOST GOVERNMENTS
HAVE FULL AND CORRECT TEXT OF U.S. PAPER, AND, IF APPRO-
PRIATE AS SUGGESTED IN REF A., POINT OUT THAT THE PAPER
MAKES CLEAR IN ITS FIRST NUMBERED PARAGRAPH THAT NOTHING IN
THE U.S. POSITION PRECLUDES OR IS INTENDED TO PRECLUDE
INVESTMENTS IN ARAB WORLD OR ANYWHERE ELSE.
2. YOU WILL NOTE THAT THERE REMAIN SOME IMPORTANT POINTS
REQUIRING MORE PRECISE DEFINITION, ESPECIALLY IN PARAGRAPH
3 NUMBERED OF C-20 DOCUMENT. THESE POINTS WILL BE DISCUSSED
IN APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL FORUMS. WE DONOT CONSIDER IT
ADVISABLE TO ATTEMPT FURTHER INTERPRETATIVES THROUGH DIPLO-
MATIC CHANNELS AT THIS TIME.
3. FYI. ONLY MAJOR OBJECTIVE OF INVESTMENT FUNDS IS NOT TO
PRECLUDE "SPECULATIVE ACTIVITY", AS IMPLIED REF TEL A. TO
GIVE ARAB STATES THIS IMPRESSION MIGHT BE MIS-INTERPRETED
AS CONTRADICTING FREE MOBILITY OFFERED IN NUMBERED PARA-
GRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF C-20 DOCUMENT. END FYI
4. TEXT FOLLOWS, "INVESTMENT IN OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS IN ONE
COUNTRY BY PRIVATE NATIONALS OF ANOTHER HAS AT TIMES GIVEN
RISE TO ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT HAVE REQUIRED
RESOLUTION. HITHERTO, SUCH FOREIGN OWNERSHIP HAS NOT BEEN
DIRECTLY BY GOVERNMENTS ON A LARGE SCALE, EXCEPT IN THE
FORM OF ASSETS HELD AS MONETARY RESERVES. IN FUTURE, HOW-
EVER, THE GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF LARGE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
ON THE PART OF A FEW OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES IS LIKELY TO
BE DESIRABLE, AND MAY WELL SURPASS IN SIZE ANY COMPARABLE
SITUATION IN THE PAST. THE DEGREE OF STABILITY OF SUCH
HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN ASSETS COULD THEORETICALLY PLAY A
POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE ROLE IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANY INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, AND THEREFORE HAS BEEN MENTIONED
AS A MATTER OF CONCERN, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH HOLDINGS ARE
TECHNICALLY CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE "RESERVES" OF THE
INVESTING COUNTRY OR WERE OUTSIDE SUCH "RESERVES." IN
JUDGING THE DESIGN OF ANY NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM,
THE QUESTION WILL BE ASKED AS TO THE MEANS, IF ANY, PROVIDED FOR HANDLING THIS SITUATION. IN APPROACHING THIS QUESTION,
WE HAVE FELT IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE INVEST-
ING COUNTRIES THEMSELVES IN FREEDOM FOR THEIR INVESTMENT
POLICIES BE FULLY RECOGNIZED.
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS FOR THE ADJUSTMENT
PROCESS, MOVEMENTS IN TOTAL RESERVES OF A COUNTRY WOULD
ASSUME A PREDOMINANT ROLE AS AN "OBJECTIVE INDICATOR,"
OF THE NEED TO TAKE ADJUSTMENT ACTION AND RESERVES WOULD IN
GENERAL NEED TO BE BROADLY DEFINED FOR THIS PURPOSE TO IN-
CLUDE A WIDE RANGE OF FOREIGN ASSETS HELD BY NATIONAL
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO FULLY RECOG-
NIZED THAT IN CERTAIN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN A LIMITED
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, IT MAY BE BOTH UNNECESSARY AND UNDE-
SIRABLE TO RETAIN SO BROAD A DEFINITION OF RESERVES, OR FOR
THE SYSTEM TO REQUIRE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS "ADJUSTMENT"
ACTION WHEN "RESERVES" REMAIN ABOVE CERTAIN PREDETERMINED
POINTS. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY THE CASE IN THE CIRCUM-
STANCES OF CERTAIN OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES WHICH EXHIBIT A
PERSISTENT STRUCTURAL TENDENCY TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN ASSETS
ESSENTIALLY IN EXCHANGE FOR ASSETS "FROM THE GROUND."
AS SECRETARY SHULTZ OBSERVED IN AN ADDRESS DELIVERED IN
PARIS JUNE 6, 1973:
- -
CERTAINLY, AS WE POINTED OUT IN PRESENTING OUR MONETARY
PLANS, THE ACCUMULATION OF LARGE CURRENT SURPLUSES BY
ARABIAN PENINSULAR STATES SHOULD NOT CALL FOR EXCHANGE RATE
ADJUSTMENT ACTIONS ON THEIR PART.
WHILE MANY OF THEIR
EXTERNAL INVESTMENTS MIGHT LOOSELY BE CONSIDERED RESERVES,
CERTAINLY THEY ARE NOT COMPARABLE TO THE KIND OF MONETARY
RESERVES THAT WOULD SUGGEST A NEED FOR MONETARY ADJUSTMENT
ACTION ON THEIR PART.
INSOFAR AS FOREIGN EARNINGS ARE SPENT FOR IMPORTS OF
GOODS AND SERVICES NECESSARY TO SECURE DOMESTIC DEVELOP-
MENT AND DIVERSIFICATION OF A COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC RESOURCES,
SO THAT THE COUNTRY'S INTERNATIONAL RESERVES DO NOT POINT
TO ADJUSTMENT ACTION, THE PROPOSED SYSTEM WOULD BE SATIS-FIED. INDEED, PROMOTION OF DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IS CLEARLY A HIGHLY SATISFACTORY MEANS OF UTILIZING
POTENTIAL SURPLUSES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS
DOMESTIC POINT OF VIEW. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, BE THE CASE
WITHOUT REGARD TO WHETHER THE SOURCE OF THE POTENTIAL SUR-
PLUS WERE TO ARISE FROM OIL PRODUCTION OR OTHERWISE.
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING TO COUN-
TRIES IN THE SAME GEOGRAPHIC REGION, WOULD ALSO OBVIOUSLY
BE A SATISFACTORY WAY OF AVOIDING OR DISPOSING OF POTENTIAL
SURPLUSES. IN THESE INSTANCES, THE SYSTEM PROPOSED BY THE
UNITED STATES WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL COUNTRIES AND THE
GREAT MAJORITY OF ALL COUNTRIES WHEN TENDING TOWARD SUR-
PLUS (INCLUDING OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES WITH LARGE POPU-
LATIONS AND LARGE FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT)
WOULD BE COVERED BY WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE.
THE ONLY PRACTICAL PROBLEM IN TERMS OF THE PROPOSED
SYSTEM, ARISES WITH RESPECT TO A VERY FEW OIL-PRODUCING
COUNTRIES WHERE THE POTENTIAL FOREIGN RECEIPTS COULD BE
SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER THAN COULD PRACTICALLY AND PRODUC-
TIVELY BE SPENT FOR DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL INTEREST, OR
IN THE INTEREST OF THOSE OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, OR IN
THE INTEREST OF THOSE POTENTIALLY RECEIVING INVESTMENT, FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM TO GIVE
SUCH COUNTRIES ANY DISINCENTIVE TO THE PRODUCTION AND
EXPORT OF OIL, OR FOR THEM TO UNDERTAKE ADJUSTMENT MEASURES
(INCLUDING EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES) OUT OF KEEPING WITH THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NON-OIL SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY. CLEARLY,
APPROPRIATE AND MUTUALLY DESIRABLE ADJUSTMENT IN THESE IN-
STANCES CAN BE ACHIEVED BY CAPITAL EXPORTS, SO THAT POTEN-
TIAL SURPLUSES OF SUCH OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES ARE AVOIDED
BY FINDING INVESTMENT OUTLETS ABROAD ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
PRODUCERS THEMSELVES. THE ONLY COMPLICATING ELEMENT, IN
TERMS OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL, IS THAT THESE CAPITAL EXPORTS
MAY HAVE AN UNUSUAL CHARACTERISTIC, IN THAT THEY ARE OWNED
AND MANAGED FOR THE MOST PART BY PUBLIC BODIES; FOR THAT
REASON THEY MAY FALL WITHIN THE RELATIVELY WIDE DEFINITION OF "RESERVES" SUITABLE IN THE GENERAL OPERATION OF THE
SYSTEM AS APPLIED TO ALL OTHER COUNTRIES.
OUR THINKING IS THAT THIS PROBLEM CAN BE RESOLVED IN A
CONSTRUCTIVE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL WAY BY PROVIDING IN
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR OFFICIAL INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
THAT A PORTION OF THE FOREIGN ASSETS HELD BY SUCH A COUN-
TRY COULD APPROPRIATELY BE CONSIDERED NOT AS MONETARY RE-
SERVE BUT RATHER AS A NATIONAL "INVESTMENT FUNDS" THIS
FUND WOULD, AT THE DISCRETION OF THE PRODUCING COUNTRY,
SIMPLY BE AN AGGREGATE ACCOUNTING OR DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN
NATIONAL INVESTMENTS WHICH IT WANTS TO REMOVE FROM ITS
"RESERVES," AND WHICH BY THE SAME TOKEN WOULD FALL OUTSIDE
THE SYSTEM BY WHICH PRESUMPTION OF A NEED TO TAKE OTHER
ADJUSTMENT ACTION WOULD ARISE. TO USE SECRETARY SHULTZ'
WORDS AGAIN, IN HANDLING THESE INVESTMENT FUNDS THERE WOULD
EXIST "ALL THE INGREDIENTS OF A HIGHLY ADVANTAGEOUS MUTUAL
BARGAIN." THOSE OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES FOR WHICH IT WOULD
BE DESIRABLE FROM EVERY VIEWPOINT TO INVEST SUBSTANTIAL
FUNDS ABROAD WOULD WANT SECURITY AND A REASONABLE RETURN ON
THEIR INVESTMENTS. MANY POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS OF THE INVEST-
MENT WOULD WELCOME IT IF THEY WERE SATISFIED IT WOULD BE
REASONABLY STABLE AND BENEFICIAL
WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO SPELL OUT ARRANGEMENTS THAT
MIGHT BE MADE IN MORE DETAIL THAN IS NECESSARY AT THIS
STAGE, A FEW POINTS OF BROAD PRINCIPLE CAN BE MENTIONED
WHICH WOULD SEEM TO US SUFFICIENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE
PROPOSED SYSTEM:
1. INVESTING COUNTRIES ESTABLISHING AN "INVESTMENT
FUND" MUST CLEARLY BE GUARANTEED THAT NOTHING
IN THEIR DECISION TO DESIGNATE SUCH A FUND DE-
TRACTS FROM THEIR INHERENT RIGHT TO MANAGE THEIR
PORTFOLIOS OF INVESTMENT ABROAD SO AS TO SEEK TO
FULFILL THE INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES WHICH IN
THEIR VIEW WILL BENEFIT THEIR ECONOMICS AND
PEOPLES. TO PROTECT THIS RIGHT, WE DO NOT CON-
TEMPLATE THAT THE IMF OR ANY OTHER OFFICIAL BODY
WOULD HAVE ANY AUTHORITY TO MAKE PROPOSALS TO
"INVESTMENT FUND" COUNTRIES WITH RESPECT TO THE AMOUNT, NATURE OR LOCATION OF THEIR INVESTMENTS.
2. COUNTRIES POTENTIALLY ON THE RECEIVING SIDE OF
INVESTMENT FROM OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, OR FROM
ANY COUNTRY, NOW HAVE THE INHERENT RIGHT TO PER-
MIT THOSE INVESTMENTS, TO ENCOURAGE THEM, TO
LIMIT THEM, OR EVEN TO EXCLUDE THEM. THESE
RIGHTS WOULD NOT BE BASICALLY ALTERED BY THE
"INVESTMENT FUND" APPROACH. INDEED, MANY POTEN-
TIAL INVESTMENT RECEIVING COUNTRIES WOULD BE
LIKELY TO WELCOME THESE INVESTMENTS TO THE EX-
TENT THEY FELT CONFIDENT THAT THEY WOULD BE
LIKELY TO REMAIN OVER SUSTAINED PERIODS OF TIME,
AND WOULD NOT BE SWITCHED SUDDENLY AMONG COUN-
TRIES IN LARGE AMOUNTS WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO
DISRUPTIVE EXCHANGE MARKET CONDITIONS. AS A
PRACTICAL MATTER, SINCE IN SOME CASES THE
AMOUNTS OF "INVESTMENT FUND" INVESTMENT COULD
REACH LARGE VOLUMES, THE INVESTING AND INVEST-
MENT RECEIVING COUNTRIES MIGHT WISH IN SOME IN-
STANCES TO ARRANGE SUCH BILATERAL CONTACTS,
UNDERSTANDINGS OR AGREEMENTS AS THEY WOULD CON-
SIDER MUTUALLY AGREEABLE, INCLUDING ASSURANCES
THAT THE INVESTMENT RECEIVING COUNTRY WOULD NOT
REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF "INVESTMENT FUND" INVEST-
MENT ALREADY PLACED IN THAT COUNTRY WITHOUT FULL
AGREEMENT OF THE AFFECTED "INVESTMENT FUND"
COUNTRY.
3. THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL COMMUNITY THROUGH
THE IMF WOULD HAVE AN INTEREST ONLY IN SATISFING
ITSELF THAT ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO "INVEST-
MENT FUNDS" ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH A SMOOTH
AND EFFICIENT FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM. TO AVOID ESTABLISHMENT OF
"INVESTMENT FUNDS" BY COUNTRIES WHERE SUCH FUNDS
WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE, IMF APPROVAL MIGHT BE
REQUIRED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY INDIVIDUAL
COUNTRY'S "INVESTMENT FUND." SUCH SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE CASES OF OIL-PRODUCING
COUNTRIES WHOSE CIRCUMSTANCES EFFECTIVELY PRE-
CLUDE ALL OF FOREIGN EARNINGS FROM BEING
SOUNDLY SPENT FOR DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
4. A STATISTICAL REPORTING SYSTEM COULD BE NEEDED
TO ENABLE THE FUNCTIONS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPHS
1., 2., AND 3., TO BE EXERCISED. "INVESTMENT
FUND" COUNTRIES MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE TO
THE IMF QUARTERLY STATISTICS COMPARABLE TO THOSE
TO BE REQUIRED MONTHLY FOR ALL COUNTRIES IN RE-
PORTING OFFICIAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES IN
THE NEW MONETARY SYSTEM. AT THE PRESENT STAGE,
THE U.S. VIEW IS THAT SUCH REPORTS ON OFFICIAL
FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS WOULD NEED TO INCLUDE:
(A) THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT, (B) THE DISTRIBUTION
OF THIS AGGREGATE AMOUNT FOREIGN COUNTRIES, AND
(C) THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN
TERMS OF ITS VALUATION BY CURRENCIES OR OTHER-
WISE. THE INFORMATION WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE
TO ALL EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS, IF THE EXTENT OF
GEOGRAPHIC AND CURRENCY DETAIL DOES NOT GO BE-
YOND WHAT IS REQUIRED IN REPORTING IN A REFORMED
SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS
IN THE "RESERVES" OF ALL MEMBERS. IN RESPECT TO
THE DATA FROM STATISTICAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS,
THE FUND'S POWERS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE USE OF
THOSE STATISTICS MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL EXECUTIVE
DIRECTORS IN THE CONTEXT OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS
PROVIDED FOR WITH ALL MEMBERS IN THE REFORMED
SYSTEM.
5. IF IN SUBSEQUENT PERIODS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DE-
FICITS EMERGED FOR AN "INVESTMENT FUND" COUNTRY,
FOR EITHER SHORT-TERM OR LONGER-TERM REASONS,
THERE WOULD BE NO OBJECTION TO THEIR TRANSFERRING NEEDED AMOUNTS FROM THEIR "INVESTMENT FUND" TO
THEIR REGULAR "RESERVES," SO THAT THESE FUNDS
COULD BE USED TO FINANCE PAYMENTS DEFICITS.
THE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS CONCERNING CON-
VERTIBILITY WOULD NOT RAISE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OR NEED TO BE
ALTERED IN RELATION TO OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES.
THE IDEAS IN THIS PAPER ARE INTENDED TO FACILITATE THE
INITIATION AND MANAGEMENT OF "INVESTMENT FUNDS" IN A MANNER
THAT WILL MEET THE REASONABLE INTERESTS AND NEEDS OF ALL
PARTIES CONCERNED. AT BOTTOM, SUCH COOPERATIVE AND BALANCED
ARRANGEMENTS MUST MEET THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ALL CON-
CERNED TO BE PRACTICAL AND SUCCESSFUL. END QUOTE ROGERS
Source: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973STATE157536_b.html
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