Sunday, September 30, 2012

TPS - Interview with Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, 2001

Interview with Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa

A charter member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank discusses the evolution of that institution, the upcoming rollout of the euro in 12 European countries and how the ECB and the Fed compare, among other issues.

Arthur J. Rolnick - Senior Vice President and Director of Research, 1985-2010
Published December 1, 2001


"...PADOA-SCHIOPPA: Currency is an institutional phenomenon. Of course, it also has a lot to do with habit, but habit in a normal society, in a normal economy, cannot depart too much from institutional arrangements. You have dollarization when you have hyperinflation. You may have euroization in Kosovo because people are desperately looking for an anchor for stability. But in an ordinary society, even if the old Deutsche mark bank notes with the strong face of Sebastian Münster were liked by German people more than the gentler face of Clara Schumann, which is now smiling on the one hundred dm notes, there is little they can do. They have to go with Clara now.
ROLNICK: I agree.
PADOA-SCHIOPPA: People may not be happy that the decision has been made to go to a monetary union, but you know there are still some monarchists in France and some republicans in the United Kingdom.
ROLNICK: And they're still not going to be happy.
PADOA-SCHIOPPA: I ask in taxis I get into, first, whether people like taxes and then would people like the euro. People don't like taxes and still they pay them. They recognize that it's part of the society to which they belong. Here in Germany, where it is notorious that there are people who were reluctant to abandon the Deutsche mark, most people—if you carry on the conversation a little bit—would recognize that it's good for Europe, that Europe is good for Germany, that it was something that had to happen one day...."

More About Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa

  • Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank since 1998
  • President of the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva, 2001
  • Member of the G-7 Deputies, 1998-present
  • Member of the G-20 Deputies, 1998-present
  • Chairman of the G-10 Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems, 2000-present
  • Chairman of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 1993-97
  • Deputy Director General, Banca d'Italia from 1984-97
  • Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs at the Commission of European Communities in Brussels, 1979-83
  • Joined Banca d'Italia in 1968 and held several positions, including Central Director for Economic Research
  • Master's degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Graduated from the Luigi Bocconi University, Milan, Italy
  • Author of numerous essays and articles. Among the most recent: "The Road to Monetary Union in Europe: The Emperor, the Kings and the Genies," published by Oxford University Press in 2000, and "EMU and Banking Supervision," in International Finance, 1999

Source:  http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/pub_display.cfm?id=3423

Saturday, September 29, 2012

Schmidt & Giscard 2000 - Laudatio by Jacques DELORS

PRESENTATION OF JEAN MONNET FOUNDATION GOLD MEDAL
TO CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT
AND PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D’ESTAING
Lausanne, 9 November
Laudatio by Jacques DELORS


Source: http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Laudatio-en.pdf

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Mundell, the Euro, and Optimum Currency Areas

by
Ronald McKinnon
May 22, 2000

Source: http://www-siepr.stanford.edu/workp/swp00009.pdf

RM - The International Monetary System: The Missing Factor

"Are present international monetary arrangements optimal? My answer is no. There is a missing ingredient in the international monetary system. The missing ingredient is a world currency, and until such a facility is created, the existing arrangements, while likely to continue, will be, at best, second best. Restoration of the gold standard at the current dollar price of gold, however, would result in deflation if the restoration led to an increase in the demand for gold (as it undoubtedly would). Gold would again become a standard of value if and only if it were made stable in terms of currencies..."

"...Gold would today make an excellent unit of value for the world economy if the conditions for its stability still existed.
...
However, there is a problem with the distribution of gold. Over one third of the stock is held by central banks and international institutions. Another third is embedded in industry and jewelry, and the remaining third is in speculative hoards. Any concerted movement of gold into or out of central bank stocks- or even the expectation of such a move-would destablize gold in terms of the commodity price level..."
...
"IS GOLD STABLE?
In short, whether gold is stable or not depends inter alia on the gold policies of governments. It is not enough to rely upon the recent quasi-stability of gold in real terms because gold might become destabilized by the very actions involved in returning to a gold standard. If any country returned to the gold standard today, its price stability could be upset by changes in the gold preferences of other countries.

The United States today, for example, holds about a quarter of the central bank stocks of gold, and seven European countries hold over half. If the United States unilaterally restored the gold standard, its price level could be destabilized by gold dumping in Europe; similarly, if powerful countries with low gold stocks began to accumulate them, the United States would suffer deflation.

It is conceivable that European countries, with their huge gold stocks, could re-establish gold as a vehicle for the promotion of their European currency. A gold ecu, or euror could conceivably provide an alternative route to European Monetary Union.12 But it would be a great mistake to embark on such a course unilaterally without agreement from other countries-especially the United States-about their gold policies. In short, a unilateral restoration of the gold standard by the United States or by Europe (or any country) would be an unwise policy that ignored the lessons of history and the implications of international interdependence..."

(21 have discussed the implications of a European Currency in EMUand the International Monetary System: A Transatlantic Perspective. Austrian National Bank Working Paper No. 13, July 1993.)

Source: http://course.lixin.edu.cn/course_center/files_upload/7c2854e2-6e70-427a-96cc-73413c92f330/content/25a8dcec-7daa-4ae6-bedb-8338e741d380/COLUMN_113/default.files/The%20International%20Monetary%20System%20The%20Missing%20Factor.pdf

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Fritz Machlup

Some publications

Source: http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/old_series-win.htm
- The Book Value of Monetary Gold.    Dec. 1971   

- Plans for Reform of the International Monetary System.    Aug. 1962; Revised ed.,
Mar. 1964   
- Euro-Dollar Creation: A Mystery Story. [Reprinted from Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 94, September 1970].
- Speculations on Gold Speculations. [Reprinted from American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 56, May 1969].     May 1969     
- The Price of Gold. [Reprinted from The Banker, Vol. 118, September 1968].     Sep. 1968 
- World Monetary Debate--Bases for Agreement. [Reprinted from The Banker, Vol. 116, September 1966].     Sep. 1966 
- From Dormant Liabilities to Dormant Assets. [Reprinted from The Banker, Vol. 117, September 1967].     Oct. 1967
- Credit Facilities or Reserve Allotments? [Reprinted from Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 81, June 1967].     Sep. 1967
- International Monetary Systems and the Free Market Economy. [Reprinted from International Payments Problems: A Symposium, Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1966].     Feb. 1966
- Real Adjustment, Compensatory Corrections, and Foreign Financing of Imbalances in International Payments. [Reprinted from Robert E. Baldwin et al., Trade, Growth, and the Balance of Payments, Chicago, Rand McNally, and Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1965].     Sep. 1965     
- The Cloakroom Rule of International Reserves: Reserve Creation and Resources Transfer. [Reprinted from Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 79, August 1965].     Sep. 1965 



Wiki: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Machlup
- "Eight Questions on Gold", 1941, AER.
- "The Need for Monetary Reserves", 1966
- "Eurodollar Creation: A mystery story", 1970, BNLQR.

AEI - Monetary Integration 1973

STUDY GROUP ON ECONOMY AND MONETARY UNION

European economic integration and monetary unification

Composition of the group:

Professor Dr. H.W.J Bosman
Professor B. De Jouvenel
Professor J. Denizet
Professor D.G.M Dosser
Professor Dr. H. Giersch
Professor G. Magnifico
Professor J. E. Meade
Professor R. A. Mundell
Professor Dr. W, Neubauer
Professor F. Onida
Professor T. Peeters

Regular commission participants in the group´s work
Mr. U. Mosca
Mr F. Boyer De La Giroday
Mr. P. Van Den Hempt
Mr. J. De Maeyer

Secretariat
Mr. J.C. Morel
Mr J. Schùler


footnote2:
This, however, does not necessarily imply that gold cannot serve any useful purpose in the construction of the European Monetary Union. Because a large body of opinion still regards gold as a factor of monetary discipline, the issue of the European currency might be linked to gold. The link should be fractional and ajdustable in order to avoid building into the mechanism of creation of the European currency a constraint of the gold-standard type. As the C.E.C. circulation explained, the link envisaged here would lead to the de facto centralization of the national gold stocks.

...

Because gold is underpriced a special official. European shadow price of gold should be set above the official price as a preliminary arrangement until a satisfactory international solution to the undervaluation of gold ie found.
...
 



Source: http://aei.pitt.edu/32789/1/Monetary_Integration_1973.pdf

AEI -CON\NdSSION DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES

Memorandum from the Commission to the Council on the organization of monetary and financial relations within the Community
(12 January 1972)
...
EMCF

Source: http://aei.pitt.edu/1013/1/monetary_COM_72_50.pdf

AEI - The European Community looks at monetary integration


 Speech by Vice-President Ortoli at the Financial Times Colloquium. Frankfurt, 14 February 1979

"...The developments which have taken place since then and which resulted in the decisions taken at the Hague Summit on Economic and Mometary, the Werner Plan, the Barre Plan, the partial establishment of the "snake" and then the initiatives launched in 1977-78 were prompted by two major considerations.

The first consideration is a political one and reflects the conviction that our countries have a common destiny. The idea ot European Union, with'all its imprecision, is the expression ot this aspiration, and Economic and Monetary Union the key instrument.

The second consideration is much more practical and of much more immediate significance. It stems from two premices: that monetary instability constitutes a major threat to our economies, and that to put an end to such instability, we must begin by establishing in Eurppe, between highly interdependent and institutionally linked economies, a zone of monetary stability..."
...

The first objective is to maintain real stability in the relationships between the currencies participating in the system

.. {a) In order to do this, any two Community currencies will each have a maximum permissible fluctuation margin of 2.25% against one other, with the exception of the lira, for which the margin will be 6%. Once the limit is reached, intervention will be automatic, but here we see the first difference with the "snake". This lies in the scale and time-span of the resources deployed to help ensure that the maximum divergence limit is not exceeded and also in their form since the EMCF will henceforth issue ECU against the deposit by the central banks of 2o% of their gold and dollar reoervcs.

...

The emergence in Europe of a zone of monetary stability is in no way an indication tlmt the Community wiches to take a stand against the United States but it docs mean that, in order to defend this stability, Europe must enter into a constructive dialogue with its major partners on the future ot the international monetary system.


Source: http://aei.pitt.edu/11369/

AEI - THE EVOLUTION OF FRANCE'S EUROPEAN MONETARY DIPLOMACY

by
Alan J. Dillingham
Assistant Professor
Political Science Department
Villanova University

"The monetary construction of Europe resembles the myth of Sisyphus in its origins, but will finish, I hope, as well as the Aeneid."
- Valéry Giscard d'Estaing
January 25, 1974

"...Since 1969, there has been a definite movement in French monetary diplomacy away from national sovereignty and towards greater integration. While Charles de Gaulle saw no need for coordinated policies, new European institutions or compromising French national sovereignty in any way, his successor, Georges Pompidou, proposed closer European cooperation through a narrowing of intra-EC parity margins and the creation of a Community Reserve Fund. When Valéry Giscard d'Estaing took office in 1974 he proposed creating a common currency for the EC, which was later incarnated within the European Monetary System (EMS) as the European Currency Unit (ECU). Building on Giscard's ideas, Edouard Balladur proposed constructing a European central bank in January 1988. The French draft treaty on economic and monetary union, submitted by Pierre B‚r‚govoy in January 1991, went beyond Giscard and Balladur's ideas, suggesting that national central banks be required to implement the decisions of a politically independent European Central Bank and that the Ecu be transformed into a single currency that would replace all national currencies within the Community. In accepting the final version of the Maastricht Treaty, France went further still in its willingness to surrender sovereignty by agreeing that all national central banks should be made politically independent and by accepting strict convergence criteria for economic policy covering price stability, interest rates, deficits, debt and currency stability..."

"...The failure of the Snake to protect the French economy from the economic and monetary turmoil of the early 1970s led Pompidou's successor, Val‚ry Giscard d'Estaing, to push French monetary diplomacy further in the direction of Europe. French'proposals centered around an idea that had long been one of Giscard's pet projects -- the creation of a common currency for the European Community.[29] The Community currency Giscard had in mind would not replace national currencies. Rather national currencies would remain in use within each national economy, while the Community currency would replace the dollar as a means of settlement between European countries. The Community currency would actually be a basket made up of the national currencies and would be backed by a portion of the official reserves of the member states pooled into a European Monetary Fund. Each national currency would have a central rate against the Community currency that could be changed if necessary.[30]
Giscard's designs were formed to counter external constraints. As his close political ally, Michel Poniatowski noted:
"(Europe) will make itself, slowly, progressively .... (I)t will be a response, a defense, a resistance to external pressures. The institutions will vary according to the intensity of these pressures. The weaker the constraint, the weaker the unification, but the stronger the constraint, the greater unification will be."[31]..."

"...Giscard himself identified monetary integration as the primary objective of France's European diplomacy.[32] The primary purpose of the Community currency would be to raise the specter of an alternative to the dollar as an international currency and thus perhaps nudge the US into taking the policy measures necessary to protect its currency.[33] If this succeeded, a measure of international, and thus European, monetary stability would be restored at little cost to Europe. If this failed, a Community currency could still provide a defense for the franc against dollar instability. By reducing the dollar's role in intra-EC payments it would reduce the vulnerability of EC currencies to fluctuations in the dollar..."

"...Giscard found turning his dream of a European currency into a reality rather difficult. In March 1975, a new unit of account for the Community was defined against a basket of EC currencies, but its use was far more restricted than the French had originally hoped.[36] Giscard's decision to bring the franc back into the Snake in July 1975 was followed by a second humiliating withdrawal in March 1976, severely weakening his diplomatic efforts to create a Community currency.[37] It wasn't until 1978 that an opening for French diplomacy presented itself. A new dollar crisis and international pressures on West Germany to reflate its economy, motivated its chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, to join with Giscard in launching the European Monetary System (EMS), which came into operation in March 1979.[38]..."

"...The new EMS saw the transformation of the European unit of account into the European Currency Unit, or ECU. Each national currency was given a divergence threshold relative to its central rate against the ECU to single out which countries might be the source of instability within the system.[39] Crossing the divergence threshold would entail a "presumption" to act, unless after consultation with the other central banks, it was agreed that action was unnecessary.[40]
However, French unwillingness yet again to compromise on the issues of policy coordination and supranationality prevented the ECU from becoming the centerpiece of the EMS. The German Bundesbank thwarted French proposals for a European Monetary Fund that would manage the ECU's rate against the dollar and insisted that the ECU be treated merely as a swap arrangement by central banks, renewable every three months by unanimous consent of the member states.[41] The system of central rates against the ECU did not replace the parity grid system of the Snake, but rather existed alongside it. Furthermore, in practice, the divergence'indicator failed to operate as a symmetrical system of adjustment between EMS currencies.[42]..."

"...Balladur's central bank initiative represented a step beyond previous French proposals to create a reserve fund and a significant movement towards closer integration. However, in some significant ways Balladur's proposals reflected a continuing French desire to minimize surrendering national sovereignty. If the French desired a European central bank, they had a very particular view about what kind of bank they wanted. A "central bank of central banks" was the desired goal which would complement, but not replace national central banks. The European central bank itself would be outside the institutional framework of the European Community and clearly subordinated to the political control of the national governments. It would manage a portion of the member states' official reserves and act on international markets to protect EC exchange rates against external disturbances. For their part, national banks would act to maintain intra-EC parities according to precise obligations for intervention and adjustment affecting strong as well as weak currency countries. It was also clear from this arrangement that the ECU would be a point of reference, a reserve instrument and a means of intra-European payments, but would not replace national currencies within their own states.[57]
Balladur's central bank initiative started the process that eventually culminated in the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991. The Hannover EC summit of June 1988 approved the appointment of an expert committee to report on monetary integration. This committee produced the Delors report in April 1989, which delineated a three stage process for creating a European central bank and a single European currency. The Madrid summit of June 1989 endorsed the Delors report and called for an intergovernmental conference to draft a new treaty for European monetary integration. The Strasbourg summit of December 1989 decided to convene this intergovernmental conference in 1990. The Rome summit in October 1990 approved an agenda for economic and monetary union which would include a European central bank and fixed exchange rates. The intergovernmental conference itself, which would produce the Maastricht Treaty, opened in Rome in December 1990...."

Source: http://aei.pitt.edu/6922/

AEI - Monetary policy in the countries of the European Economic Community. Institutions and instruments

Source: http://aei.pitt.edu/33643/