Friday, January 20, 2012

TE - One memo - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976 Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 88

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976
Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 88


88. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Enders) to the President's Assistant for Economic Affairs (Seidman)1

  • SUBJECT
  • President's Meeting with Secretary Simon Tomorrow on the Role of Gold
1. Two points remain to be settled on gold: (a) whether or not there will be a limit in the amount of gold countries can hold in the future, and (b) whether countries will be permitted to trade in gold.

2. In our view we can sacrifice the first, but must obtain the second.

3. France will never accept a country limitation on its gold holdings. If we insist on this point, there will be no agreement reached on gold at this time. This is undesirable from several viewpoints.
  • —Without a package agreement on demonetizing gold, the Europeans will be tempted to set up a new gold-based currency bloc. Their scope for doing so will increase in the future as their oil deficits diminish.
  • —Our leverage for obtaining something satisfactory on gold is now at a maximum because we can block a quota increase in the IMF which other countries want much more than we do.
  • —Unless we give in on the country limitation point, we will not get agreement from others to go ahead with the IMF Trust Fund for the least developed countries, which Secretaries Kissinger and Simon proposed last Fall.
4. The role of gold in the system can be reduced even without a country limitation on gold holdings as long as (a) there is a global limitation and (b) central banks cannot use gold for settlements among themselves except in narrowly defined emergencies.

5. Germany has joined France in resisting this second condition, not for doctrinal reasons, but for political solidarity.

6. In order to resolve the issue, we must first swing Germany, thus isolating France. We recommend (a) that Chairman Burns first gain the Bundesbank's support for a compromise; (b) that the President write Schmidt proposing it; and (c) that Chairman Burns follow up with Schmidt this weekend.
Thomas O. Enders

1 Source: Ford Library, L. William Seidman Papers, Box 69, Economic Policy Board Subject File, Gold. Confidential. Attached to an undated note from Nuel Pazdral, Enders's Special Assistant, to Seidman that reads: "Mr. Enders asked that the attached memo be transmitted to you now, with the note that it has not yet been approved by Secretary Kissinger." Also attached is a June 5 note from Seidman to President Ford that reads: "Attached is a memorandum from Tom Enders on the gold issue which reached my office after the briefing paper was submitted yesterday." The briefing paper to which Seidman referred was his June 4 memorandum to the President summarizing Documents 86 and 87 and requesting a Presidential decision. The President did not indicate his decision on the June 4 memorandum from Seidman. (Ibid., William Simon Papers, Drawer 23, Folder 2, Gold, 1974 (Nov)–1975)

Source: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d88

One Memo - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976 Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 85

85. Paper Prepared in the Department of the Treasury1


Proposed Understandings with Respect to Gold

Among the Governments Represented in the G–10

No participating government will take actions individually, or in concert with others, to attempt to peg the market price of gold at any particular level or to maintain it within any particular range or to use gold as a regular settlement medium.

Each government agrees that its trading in gold will be governed by the general understandings outlined below until such time as an agreement is reached among the governments concerned to modify or eliminate the understandings. An intensive review to consider possible changes in the understandings will be held within two years. The understandings are that:

a. No participating government will purchase gold from any source when the effect would be to increase the total gold holdings of IMF member governments and of the IMF above the level of their combined holdings on May 1, 1975;

b. No government will purchase gold directly from another government, or purchase gold from any source if such purchases would cause the gold held by the purchasing government to exceed its holdings on May 1, 1975, except that a government may, regardless of the level of its gold holdings, purchase gold from another government to facilitate a sale of gold by the latter government because of an emergency need to mobilize a portion of its gold holdings.

Among the Executive Directors of the IMF
a. During 1975 the IMF will be authorized to sell at the official price approximately SDR 100 million to a special account to be administered by the IMF for the purpose of lowering the effective interest rate paid by the most seriously affected developing countries on drawings in 1975 from the Oil Facility, provided the special account receives commitments for an appropriate volume of additional voluntary contributions from governments.

b. During the next several months the Executive Board will work in cooperation with the Secretariat of the Development Committee to prepare for consideration by the Development Committee and the Interim Committee not later than December 31, 1975, a detailed proposal for establishment of a trust fund to be administered by the IMF for making medium term concessional loans to the poorest member governments using in part funds received through voluntary contributions and in part funds acquired through gradual resale in the market of gold, sold to the Trust Fund by the IMF at the official price of gold.

1 Source: Ford Library, Arthur Burns Papers, Federal Reserve Board Subject Files, Box B52, Gold, Jan.–May 1975. No classification marking. Attached to a May 20 note from Truman to Burns that reads: "Attached is a statement on gold that Jack Bennett said that he had distributed for discussion at the G–10 Deputies' meeting last week in Paris. Mr. Bennett reported to the International Monetary Group that this statement represented 'his personal understanding of the position of the United States.'"

Source: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d85

AB - One Memo - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976 Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 3

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976
Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 3


3. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (Burns)1

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to international monetary policy.]
Burns: Now, I was going to talk about something else, but there was a trip to Japan, but the—that trip, in view of the foreign exchange problem, George is going to tell you about plans that we've been discussing. I have—it's been discussed with the Japanese; with Tanaka and with Sasaki, the head of their central bank.2
Nixon: Yeah.
Burns: They're waiting for word from me, and I will just tell them I will as soon as I can, but I have [unclear]—
Nixon: Well, it's good that you go.
Burns: I'll go later on, but this isn't quite—
Nixon: Take your time.
Burns: —this isn't quite the time. And I'll check with you before I go, because I want to be sure—
Nixon: Incidentally, I was going to tell you: Henry is going to stop in, stop in Japan for a 4-hour—3- or 4-hour visit with Tanaka on the way back,3 but he won't be going into this sort of thing. But, we're touching base with them, so if you could get over there some time, it'd be useful.
Shultz: When will Henry—when will Henry go to Japan?
Nixon: May 9th—8th, 8th, 8th—
Burns: [unclear] Before George gets going on the foreign exchange crisis that—which we face, let me give you just a few figures. This is taking on very sizable proportions. Since January 22nd, when it began, the outflow of dollars amounts to $4.3 billion, and 2.6 of that has gone to Germany, and the rest is scattered. So, it's no long—and today, today the Germans took in a billion and a half; so, it has accelerated.
Nixon: They took a billion and a half?
Burns: Well, I should keep my [unclear]—
Nixon: So, what do we do about it?
Shultz: Mr. President, [unclear] talked about this a little while ago, a few days ago, and we did agree to modest intervention. Not so much on the grounds that we thought we should go all out on that, but rather that we should have evidence that we had done our part to—
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Shultz: —have things be stable. And we've done that, although we still have not yet used up all of our $200 million that we decided to lay out for ourselves. In fact, I think we've used about $37 million of it so far. But, we have had a number of meetings involving Arthur, Herb Stein, Paul Volcker, myself, Bill Rogers, Bill Casey just sat in on the most recent ones, and Peter Flanigan has been our—
[unclear exchange]
Shultz: We pretty much agree among ourselves that this speculative flurry that we now see, whether it passes or not, is based on reality. The reality is that our trade deficit is very large—$6 billion or so this year. It has slowed down, as was expected. We expect it will go down next year. But even so, the reality is we have a gigantic trade deficit, and we have a very large balance of payments deficit, however one wants to measure it.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Shultz: We don't think that's going to go away in a hurry. Therefore, we feel that there is this underlying situation that needs correction, and the Smithsonian Agreement4 basically didn't do it, in part because it wasn't large enough, in part because there are all sorts of offsets that countries have used, and in part because it's deteriorated. As—the British, now, have an exchange rate this is below where they started in the Smithsonian, so that they not only are back to where we started from, but below that. So, for all of those reasons, it seems to this group that we have a situation that's out of balance. We have talked about a package of things that might be done that has the following ingredients, and there are variations on each one of these, but I'll summarize the line that is sort of the prevailing view. It would call for, first of all, a devaluation by the U.S. on the order of 6½ percent or so, and then a special effort with the Japanese to get them to revalue by that amount, so that the net for the Japanese would be 15 percent, or 13 percent, and with respect to the rest of the world, we would have a devaluation by the U.S. This involves persuading the Europeans, particularly, to stand still and not try to, to counter any move they think we might make, as well as persuading the Japanese to revalue when we devalue. We think that the—if that were done, if we made that effort, it would be harder to persuade the Japanese than it would be the Europeans, is sort of the assessment of the situation. But, nevertheless, there is a reasonable prospect that that would happen. We feel that if that were done just by itself, people might very well view that and say, "Well, you did that once, and it didn't seem to work very well. So, why are you just doing that again and not searching elsewhere for things that could be done?" And they might even point to our, our plan and say, "In the plan, it calls for revaluations and devaluations of this kind when a basic imbalance is clear, but it also suggests that we should do other things than just change the exchange rates." So, we would put as a second part of this program an announcement that we do intend to go forward with trade legislation before the Congress that would allow, would permit, give the President authority to negotiate in a manner that would help to expand world trade, but at the same time, have very strong provisions in it that would protect our workers and our businesses and would enable us to bargain for a fair deal in world trade. It would also have in it a provision through which you could declare a balance of payments emergency and impose a surcharge. We think that if we were in a position to tell the Japanese that, that would have quite some impact on their willingness to go along with revaluation, without anything.
Nixon: Hmm.
Shultz: At any rate, we would have a trade package, which could be stated in a speech in a general way. And our thought about it is that if this comes rapidly, that we should say, or we might say, rather than the meeting with [unclear] that we're going to consult with members of Congress, and with labor, business, and so forth, about our ideas before locking them in concrete and presenting them, so that we would have a chance to rally support for it rather than just announcing it. Although, I would say that we have made a great deal of headway since the last time you and I talked. Last week, we had a lengthy go-around on it, and we have a pretty good talking paper now. That announcement spells out reasonably well what we have in mind, that we're prepared.
Nixon: Hmm.
Shultz: There is concern about the implications of these moves for the gold market. And to some extent, in a perverse way, I guess, Paul Volcker, in particular, feels that people may suspect that somehow or other we are interested in getting the price of gold up—I guess because we have so much of it—and that we are afraid to sell any. Of course, we're constrained by our, by our agreement with other central banks against selling gold at market rate,5 and since our private position has been that we're willing to do this if others agree, we should make that public and say that we're quite willing to, when and if we think it's appropriate, to sell gold on the private market. If that's what others want to do, put ourselves in a position to talk with them about that. And this would, on the one hand, show that we're not trying to hold on to this forever, and at the same time, it probably would have the effect of not permitting a large increase in the price of gold since we've had quite a lot of it—
Burns: Hmm. And, also—
Nixon: [unclear]—
Burns: And, also, we were respecting an international agreement.
We'd do it only if the others want to do it.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Burns: We're not going do it by ourselves.
Shultz: We might tail on to this, although this is a relatively minor item, but it's something to talk about—it's in the Republican platform—the right of private citizens of the U.S. to—
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: —sell gold. That's something that the conservative community, particularly—
Nixon: Gold traders.
Shultz: —would be interested in. But this is something we could or couldn't do to [unclear]—
Burns: [unclear]—
Shultz: —in the package at this point. And, finally, with respect to our capital controls program that we've been struggling to get rid of, which you promised to get rid of back in 1968—6
Nixon: Arthur told me to say it.
Shultz: Well, he was right and—
Nixon: That's right.
Shultz: —it's hard to do.
Nixon: That's right.
Shultz: Now, we might say, "Now, we're trying to establish a general equilibrium right here, and we are going to phase these controls out over a period of time," and now some end-date in a year or two years from now, let's put that forward as a program. We have—now, all of these things are broadly consistent with our international monetary and trade plans we've put forward; that is, this is behavior that is in accord with what we said a nation should do when there is definite evidence of an imbalance. And we also said that not only should a nation that is running a deficit do something, but nations that are running a surplus should also do something—we make that particularly strong with the Japanese. So, that is sort of the nature of the problem. It may—the immediate crisis may or may not pass.
Nixon: What—
Shultz: We think that it will recur and that, that perhaps this week, or sometime very soon, we should be prepared to take action that is in the nature of leadership on this.
Nixon: What would be the timetable on that? You mean, like, like this week? You mean, like—
Burns: Tomorrow.
Nixon: —next week?
Burns: Tomorrow.
Nixon: Make a speech tomorrow?
Shultz: Well—
Burns: No. No speech.
Nixon: Oh, [unclear]—
Shultz: We have—we have—
Nixon: Oh, the action? [unclear] right now—
Shultz: We have, we—we have these things to do. We have—
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: Things like that, right now.
Shultz: We have—we have to try to get the Japanese to agree. We think that's probably the first port of call.
Nixon: So, you can tell that—you can tell them categorically that I decided to ask for legislation to impose a surtax. Declare that, if you need that—
Shultz: Now, that would have some impact.
Nixon: —that's one club.
Shultz: And, then, right on the heels of the Japanese, discussion with the Europeans. We think we should try to do this in the space of about three days, or something like that—
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Shultz: —because there is a, I would say, quite a high probability that there'll be leaks as this goes on.
Nixon: Hmm. That's an understatement.
Shultz: Particularly with the Japanese thing, too; it's been very leaky. And then, we should be prepared to move ahead.
Nixon: Well, let's come again now with regard to [unclear]. What did you have in mind in terms of when Congressional leaders—you see, Congressional leaders, a lot of them, George, are going to be taking off Thursday,7 you know, for this silly thing [unclear]. It's not silly Republicans, but they all take off. You could get to them, but [unclear] when you talk about, for example, getting speechwriters, or something, what did you have in mind? Or, do you have a speechwriter only when you have something to present to the Congress [unclear]—?
Shultz: Right. Well, there are, there are, in a sense, these timing points. There's one point in time in which you decide, "All right, let's do this."
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Shultz: Then, there's an elapsed time, while we try to get our trading partners to go along with it.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Shultz: Relatively short vista.
Nixon: [unclear] on the monetary side?
Burns: No—
Shultz: Right, well, monetary side—[unclear exchange]
Shultz: —knowing—knowing the fact that you have made the decision—
Nixon: Well, right—
Shultz: —that you're not going to [unclear] sit here.
Nixon: Right.
Shultz: You're going to go ahead with the trade legislation whether they like that or not.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Shultz: You're proposing this exchange rate realignment.
Nixon: Hmm.
Shultz: If they don't go along with it, then we're not convertible into gold, and we will announce what we think proper exchange values are, and they will have to struggle in their currency markets, and we won't help them any. But that's a—that is a—
Nixon: Arthur, what is your feeling about getting rid of controls? You know, about a year ago, you had thought that we shouldn't move on that. Are you, are you—do you feel we can now?
Burns: I'd phase them out—
Nixon: You would?
Burns: —and announce a schedule, but I would do it over 2 or 3 years; would indicate, you see, that they're going to be phased out and indicate the period. [unclear]—
Nixon: What about the gold thing? Now, I—now, what about the gold thing? Do you—does that bother you [unclear]?
Burns: No, the only thing that would bother—
Nixon: I mean the purchase of gold—the right of the private citizen to purchase gold.
Burns: Oh, I think—I think that's a silly business.
Nixon: You wouldn't put it in?
Burns: No, I wouldn't. But, I don't know that I would—I don't know that I would fight awfully hard against it. It could, you see—it's silly; it could be counterproductive in a minor way, because—
Nixon: That's what I heard—
Burns: —people might want to accumulate gold and would be importing gold, and thereby—
Nixon: Yeah.
Burns: —worsening our balance of payments. But, if you saw some political advantage—I doubt it. I think they've—you know, the number of people who worry about this, I don't think—I doubt if one [unclear]—
Nixon: Well, first, the number of people that understand it is very small.
Burns: One one-hundredth of one percent.
Nixon: Yeah. Well—
Burns: I wouldn't [unclear]—
Nixon: —let's come to the, the main—
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: Oh, yes.
Burns: Central banks having now the power or willingness to sell off into private hands, because that means, you see, a gradual dismantling of gold in the international monetary system.
Nixon: What we're talking about now, then, is a decision with regard to devaluation by 6½ percent.
Shultz: And a drive to get the Japanese to match it.
Nixon: And you—you all agree this is what should happen—should be done?
Shultz: Well, there's some—on that, there is a variation on the theme that is not favored by the group, but which is nevertheless, I think, an important variation. And that is to say, and we wouldn't have to consult with anybody about this, that we think the dollar is still over-valued, and that exchange rates should change, and they should change by something like this amount, and that that's our view, and we're not going to engage in any intervention or whatnot. In other words, more or less float the dollar and try to force others to let it float. Now—
Nixon: You don't like that?
Shultz: Arthur doesn't like that at all.
Burns: [unclear]—
Nixon: [laughs] I know. I—[unclear exchange]
Shultz: I'm not sure, I'm not sure that I'd like it, but, after I—
Nixon: You'd lean that way normally, but not now?
Shultz: I—I have my inclinations. I think the, the principal argument for it is that when you set another set of parities, then there is a—at least an implicit—
Nixon: Then where do you go from there?
Shultz: —suggestion that you're going to defend those reasonably, so—
Nixon: Like we were going to defend the Smithsonian rates. Yeah.
Shultz: And, when—and our trade picture won't improve dramatically. And we could come up against another crisis if people get in the habit of pushing us over. So that, just as the British had these successive devaluations that were not, not too successful, they now have a float,8 which they regard as much more successful, because a float basically insulates you against this kind of speculative rate. The rate just moves rather than, the, there being an accumulation of dollars going in here, or going out of there. So, that is, that is an advantage to the floating system. Now, I would have to say, the basic plan we've put forward envisaged discrete exchange rate changes in a situation like ours, for a country like us, so that to float would not be fully consistent with our plan, even though we envisaged other countries possibly doing it.
Nixon: The problem, too, with the—the British can do that; it doesn't make a great deal of difference to the world. And Asia; it still doesn't make a great deal of difference—
Burns: That's the problem.
Nixon: But if we do it—
Shultz: Right.
Nixon: —it does make a great deal of difference. And I just—
Burns: [unclear]—
Nixon: And I think it's just too much of a "To hell with the rest of the world" as a policy—
Burns: That's exactly right; it would be regarded as economic belligerency on our part against everybody else.
Nixon: The way that it has to be presented, George, you understand, on this 6? percent, and so forth, is—you remember, we got by with the August 15th thing by pointing out this doesn't affect the value of your dollar and so forth.9 The average person doesn't know a damn thing about this; it's the stock market people and international monetary people. But, the way it has to be presented is that the dollar, at the present time—that we are doing this because American goods are at a disadvantage, in an unfair advantage in the world market, and that's due to the fact that the dollar is overvalued as against other currencies. And so, we are trying to—we're change—we're making this change in order to get, again, American goods in a competitive position. You know, if you go back and [unclear] the August 15th, for the rhetoric at least—
[unclear exchange]
Shultz: —the trade package to go with it.
Nixon: The trade package is—
Shultz: That describes the spirit—
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: And the trade package should be one that should be—but should be, in its rhetoric, tilted very hard for protection. And what we do, of course, tilt it—what we do, however, being as expansive as possible, so that—because, basically, I do not believe in a, in a totally protective, or a—I mean [unclear] and neither of you are. I believe in protection for certain purposes, and the Congress certainly does, but if we have to move, if we can move other nations to trade, why we should move in that direction. If they don't want to, if they're going to protect, though, we've got to do, too.
Shultz: Well, that was [unclear]—
Nixon: Is that the way you—?
Shultz: —you managed that tone in your speech at the IMF,10 and that was found in the plan, but I think we could afford to lay that out a little heavier than this.
[unclear exchange]
Burns: Another—another ingredient in any such statement would be a re-emphasis of the importance of curbing inflation, and what we are doing about it, because this is one—this is perhaps the major weapon that we have for re-establishing our position in international trade. We have price stability, whereas other countries are inflating.
Nixon: But if we have price stability, Arthur, here, why then, is the value [unclear] the dollar overvalued, then?
Burns: Well, you know, we haven't had it long enough. And the difference between us and the other countries has not been so great. So you, so you accent the importance. I would use this opportunity, and maybe, maybe you can—maybe we can, at that time, want to announce something on the price front, you know? In any case, a re-emphasis of your determination to curb inflation, the—as a way of raising—
Shultz: There is one small thing that we could announce, which would not mean too much, but it's something the Congress has talked about a lot; namely, a requirement that large firms and unions give thirty days notice before they change a wage or a price. That doesn't change the structure of the system at all except that it imposes an additional reporting requirement. And, at least, has the sound of [unclear].
Nixon: Yeah.
Burns: Have you been asked about that?
Shultz: No, that didn't come up in the testimony—
Burns: What would you say if you were asked in testimony? This may come my way tomorrow.11
Shultz: I think that it is, it is something that we can do within the framework of the law.
Burns: Sure.
Shultz: And—
Nixon: And that we are—
Shultz: —we would prefer to have it left as an open possibility. We may do it, or we may not.
Burns: Hmm.
Shultz: If the Congress wants to suggest that they like that idea, we'd be very interested in that—
Nixon: We would be—why don't you put it this way: "We'd be very interested in the views of the Congress on this." Let them say—that, we are—as far as the administration is concerned, that we—that is one of the devices we have under consideration, but we're also—we'd be interested if they—you know, they all talk about wanting responsibility [unclear]. I mean, maybe they think it's a good idea or not a good idea.
Shultz: I think the thing we would want to avoid, though, is having them put it in the law as some [unclear]—
Nixon: A requirement. That's right. That's right.
Shultz: Then we'd lose our flexibility.
Nixon: We want to be flexible on it. But I would, it wouldn't bother me any to require if—
Burns: Hmm.
Nixon: No, unless the reporting would just be for prices, I think it would be an enormous [unclear].
Shultz: Well, the—that's one of the things. It leads to a—
Nixon: [unclear]
Shultz: —gigantic paperwork burden.
Nixon: Jesus.
Shultz: And we are trying to wean the business community away from an attitude of overdependence and reliance on government all the time. [unclear]—
Nixon: What would concern me would be the price—the paperwork on the price side. The wage side wouldn't be that much, but the price side—phew! [unclear]
Shultz: We would have to have some—we could have some [unclear] on that.
Nixon: All right.
Shultz: We—we've talked about it, and we've thought about it, and I think you and I talked about it a little bit—
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: —and so it was considered, and we, we felt we didn't want to do it. But it isn't a big thing. We could put something like that in the speech. The trouble with putting it in a speech like this is that, well, that it isn't a—
Nixon: Not 'til we [unclear]—
Shultz: —it isn't a piece on, on the scale of the other pieces in importance.
Burns: Hmm.
[unclear exchange]
Nixon: —pretty much be basically a one-subject thing dealing with the international monetary, trade and [unclear] certainly, the—what we are doing [unclear]. But don't, don't mix it up too much.
Burns: Hmm.
Nixon: And, just, just zero in on the one problem and handle it. Burns: You, you understand, Mr. President, the—you could be criticized on the ground that part of this plan is a repetition of what we did before.
Nixon: Sure.
Burns: And, therefore, your old policy didn't work, Mr. President. I think that's why you need this trade piece as part of the package.
Nixon: Trade?
Burns: Yeah. That has to be [unclear] great emphasis.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Burns: That's the new product.
Nixon: You mean the [unclear]—you mean the trade aspect in terms of being able to stop imports?
Burns: No—well, sure; the authority to approach and negotiate both ways, either to liberalize or to stiffen.
Nixon: Whereas, the other time, all we did was impose a surcharge. Right?
Burns: That's right.
Shultz: Which we then took off when we were able to negotiate changing—
Nixon: Changing the exchange rates.
Burns: And, in retrospect—in retrospect, you took it off a little too fast for it—
Nixon: Yeah, we were under a lot of heat from the [unclear]—
Burns: Yeah. But, the—but we couldn't have gotten the agreement without it and—
Nixon: And we bought a little time.
Burns: Yeah.
Nixon: What about an international—is the time ever going to come, in the 3 years and 11 months we have left here, to have an international monetary—arrangement that's going to mean anything? We don't want to just lurch from crisis to crisis.
Burns: Hmm. Well [unclear]—
Shultz: Although I think this actually could—
Burns: This could—
Shultz: —help move the thing along, in the sense that—
Burns: Crises have a function.
Shultz: —we are—
Nixon: Yes.
Shultz: —we are moving—in this plan, we are moving in parallel with what we propose. And, to the extent that we are able to improve our balance of payments and trade and trade position, we're clearing up one of the greatest problems in the monetary system; namely, the big overhang of the U.S. The problem, you see, has to get solved before you can put any machinery into place as a—sort of a stable [unclear] proposition.
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Burns: Mr. President, let me plant a thought in your mind. If the—
Nixon: [unclear]
Burns: The—I don't know how these conversations are going to go. On trade, I'm very much discouraged. On monetary reform, well, we're proceeding at a snail's pace—no, no—
Nixon: Um-hmm?
Burns: —sense of urgency. This crisis may give us a strong lever, and we may move forward as a result. But, we can't be sure. The way my thinking has been running is that, you know, you send the Eberles of this world—I don't mean Eberle as an individual—
Nixon: I know.
Burns: —I meant having that function, and they get together, and they wrestle, and they debate, and they just irritate one another and get nowhere. Now, I'm afraid that's the mood. The—my own thinking has been running in this direction more and more; in that trade, monetary reform, and defense—international security, will all have to be handled together and will have to be done at the summit level. But, to handle it at that level, we—we've got to be more fully prepared, I would say, than we are at the moment, because if you go in to a summit conference, you will want to be very sure as to precisely the point where you want to come out and then know the margin for—that could be negotiated out—
Nixon: Negotiate.
Burns: But, we want to try and work these things out. You see, they're related. But I would not be surprised if, in the end, it would have to be done that way, and I just mention this as something you might want to keep in the back of your mind in the months ahead.
Nixon: By a summit, do you mean just the Big Six? Japan, Italy—Burns: Yes. Right—
Nixon: France, Germany, England, and the U.S. And Canada—?
Burns: And maybe, and maybe—and maybe not even the Big Six. Maybe the Big Four or Five; you know, the rest will fall in to place.
Nixon: Japan, England, France, Germany, U.S. Right. That's it.
Burns: Well, now, you take the Smithsonian Conference; it's a very good indication. Your meeting with Pompidou, you know, that really settled the thing.12 Sure, a lot of things to work out after that, but they all fell into place. Without that, we'd be lost. The Finance Ministers would have met and continued meeting; we would have gotten nowhere. And I think our strongest card is the—we don't have strong cards on trade, considering the way the world is organized.
Nixon: It's against us.
Burns: Well—
Nixon: And for themselves.
Burns: Well, for themselves; I think that's a better way of putting it.
Nixon: That's right.
Burns: And, on the monetary side, well, our strong card is defense. We are protecting the world, and they know it. Nixon: Yeah, and they don't want to pitch in—
Burns: It's a hard card for you to play, and they know that, but this is something that you, and you alone, can best evaluate at the right time.
Nixon: [pause] Well, let's begin by saying that we'll go forward with your 6½, 6½ business. That's obvious, right? You've reached that decision, too?
Shultz: That's—yes [unclear]—
Nixon: Gone that far today. All right?
Shultz: Have gone that far sort of by nature of—
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: —free market [unclear]—
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. All right. Well, I think it's responsible. So, we go with 6½, 6½. With the Japanese, use the stick in the closet to the effect that I have decided to ask for legislation that will provide, as you know, the imposition of a surcharge. And also, the—what was that other thing you were talking about? The—if the market is flooded—?
Shultz: The safeguard system.
Nixon: The safeguard system. We gotta—we put that in there, too? Shultz: Yes, sir, that's in—
Nixon: Might as well stick it all in. And then, beyond that, in terms of—you will do some consulting, is that right, now, with the Congressional people? Or have you done a lot of it already?
[unclear exchange]
Burns: Well, we can't—
Nixon: Can't consult—
Burns: —can't consult Congress on devaluation.
Shultz: Yeah, we can consult on the trade.
Nixon: On the trade—oh, actually, I meant trade.
Burns: Oh—
Nixon: On the devaluation, you've got to dicker on, right now.
Shultz: On the trade, we ought—
Nixon: How will you handle the devaluation? Who do you talk to? The—the Japanese Ambassador here? Or does our Ambassador talk to them?
Burns: No—
Shultz: I think we probably have to send Volcker to Japan—
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: —to talk to their Finance Minister and, no doubt, Tanaka.
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: And we have a draft letter—13
Nixon: Uh-huh?
Shultz: —suggested for you to show—
Nixon: Sure.
Shultz: —to Tanaka—
Nixon: [unclear]—
Shultz: —that emphasizes your concern about this and dispatches
Volcker or whomever you decide—
Nixon: Right. Right.
Shultz: —to—
Nixon: Then who goes—then somebody else goes to England and
Germany—?
Shultz: Yes, somebody else, because one person can't go around [unclear]—
Nixon: And all this is over the next 3 or 4 days, right?
Shultz: Could go immediately in this 3 or 4 days. Or, we could wait, though—
[unclear exchange]
Shultz: We tend to lose leadership capacity—
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: —when we wait—
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: —particularly if the crisis heats up. If it passes, then we're—Burns: Hmm.
Shultz: —we have a little bit more running room. [unclear]—
Nixon: Well, all right, you've—let me say that on that decision, you fellows will just have to meet. I—your judgment will be better than mine in all this, as to whether [unclear]—there are no political problems involved. It wasn't—it wasn't like it was, you know, with the other thing—we had the French to worry about, and the British to worry—we don't give a damn about any of them politically, now. The Japanese sensitivities—to hell with them. Let's go right ahead.
Shultz: Well, I think the process of going around this way will make this—
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Shultz: —much different from the others. It means that if—
Nixon: When will you be ready for the—when will you be ready if you have to on the business of some sort of a Presidential statement? That would not be next week, I presume. Not that soon and—
Burns: Could be.
Shultz: Could be next week.
Burns: Could be next week.
Shultz: Could be next—
Nixon: 'Cause I will be in California next week, because I meet
Kissinger from—coming in from Japan on the 19th, Monday.
Shultz: Uh—
Nixon: Well, somebody better get busy on that.
Shultz: Well—or, if we may be able to move this in time, I take it you would prefer to not to do it quite so fast if—unless [unclear]—
Nixon: Well, I would prefer—I would prefer not to do it; I would prefer not to go all out on trade. [unclear]—the matter of financing doesn't bother me at all. I mean, the monetary thing; that should be done. But, in terms of going out on sort of a, a reckless basis next week, saying, "Here is a brand new trade thing because of the crisis, and dee-dee-dee-dee-dee [etc.]." I don't like the feel of that. I would prefer to do that in a more deliberate way. But, but if we—but, if it's necessary to do it next week in order to accomplish the monetary thing, we'll do it next week. That's the way I would look at it.
Shultz: We think there's a big advantage, both to the monetary move and to getting the trade business going right, to put them together in a package. We—we need to do some consulting on the trade business. George Meany called this morning and invited—
Nixon: Um-hmm.
Shultz: —me down for this weekend, and as soon as I can come. And I talk about Bill,14 and he said he'd love have to have Bill come down. We can look forward to talking with him about it.
Nixon: What about—
[unclear exchange]
Shultz: I—I haven't got those dates yet.
Nixon: [unclear]—
Burns: George, why can't we carry out some conversations this week with key Congressmen on the trade issue?
Shultz: We can.
Nixon: Trade issue won't help.
Shultz: We're in position now; we've got a reasonable agreement—Nixon: Well, I think I'm seeing Burns tomorrow—possibly. Is that, is that what you would recommend? Or, you did not know about that?
Shultz: You mean Mills?
Burns: Mills.
Nixon: Sorry. I meant—
Shultz: No, I just—I didn't know about that, but—
Nixon: [unclear]—
Burns: Wilbur Mills—Wilbur—seeing Wilbur Mills? Oh, that's fine. Nixon: Yeah, I just want to be sure that we're ready to see him, that you've suggested we go to—Arthur had a suggestion that—
Shultz: I didn't, but I think it's a good idea. I would like Burns—
Nixon: [unclear]—
Shultz: —to be present if you're going to see him.
Nixon: All right. All right.
Shultz: Now, we have these tax problems that he'll want to talk about, and we haven't had a chance to get your thinking on that.
Nixon: All right, fine. Fine. Fine.
Shultz: When, when is the Mills meeting, Mr. President?
Nixon: They're trying to set it up this Saturday—tomorrow afternoon, sometime.15 Does that fit in with yours?
Shultz: Well, it would, yes, because I'll be testifying in the morning.
Nixon: Yeah.
Shultz: As I understand, it we're scheduled to talk about tax issues in the afternoon—
Nixon: Yes, at 3, I take it—
Shultz: So, if we had him after that, that would be good. [Bull entered at an unknown time after 5:11 p.m. Bull left at an unknown time before 6:03 p.m.]
Nixon: [unclear] I'd like to have Arthur there, but we can't impose on his independence.16
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to international monetary policy.]
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 851–4. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Nixon met with Shultz and Burns in the Oval Office from 5:11 to 6:10 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
2 Tadashi Sasaki was the Governor of the Bank of Japan.
3 Kissinger traveled throughout Asia, February 7–20, with stops in Bangkok, Vientiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Tokyo.
4 In December 1971, representatives of the G–10 countries, meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, agreed to realign the relative values of their currencies. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 221.
5 In March 1968, the central bank governors of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed to establish a two-tier market for gold: that is, central bankers would continue to buy and sell gold among themselves at the official gold price but would no longer engage in transactions in the private gold market, thus allowing the private market price to fluctuate.
6 On January 1, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced a series of measures designed to address the U.S. balance of payments deficit; among the measures were new restraints on U.S. foreign direct investment. For the text of Johnson's statement, as well as his remarks on the balance of payments program at a press conference held that same day, see Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–1969, Book I, pp. 1–13. On October 3, 1968, the Republican National Committee issued a statement by candidate Richard Nixon vowing to rescind these restraints. (The New York Times, October 4, 1968, p. 1)
7 February 8.
8 The British pound had been floating since June 1972.
9 A reference to President Nixon's August 15, 1971, announcement of his New Economic Policy, which included suspension of the dollar's gold convertibility and the imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on dutiable imports. In his remarks, the President discussed "the bugaboo of what is called devaluation" and its implications for the American people. The text of the President's announcement is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 886–891.
10 On September 25, 1972, President Nixon addressed the annual IMF and World Bank Boards of Governors meeting. For the text of his remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 907–911.
11 Burns testified before the Senate Banking Committee on February 7.
12 President Nixon and French President Pompidou held a summit meeting in the Azores December 13–14, 1971, where they laid the foundation for the monetary agreement concluded by the G–10 at the Smithsonian Institution later that month. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 219–220.
13 Presumably a reference to Document 4.
14 Not further identified.
15 See Document 157.
16 In a conversation with Nixon on February 8, Shultz said: "But at any rate, we've got to see what happens in Bonn, and so on. And, maybe they will agree to our deal, and maybe they won't. If they don't, then, you remember, our plan is to just go ahead and make a unilateral announcement that we think the exchange rates are not in line, and make a statement to the IMF along those lines and say, 'We're not going to do anything that will try to hold exchange rates that we think are obsolete.' And that will just cause the markets to go absolutely nutty [laughs], and I think it will force their hand. It will be acrimonious. It will not be as good as having worked it out, but we're in the position of saying, 'Look, we tried to work it out with you. And if—we have done this minor intervention ourselves'—and I took quite a beating on that yesterday—but the purpose of doing it is to be able to say to the Germans, 'Look, this thing is out of kilter. You've spent billions of dollars, and we put some money in, and we put some good faith into this thing, and that just shows you that we couldn't stop it.' So, I think that we're in a good talking position that way." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 853–12)


Source: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d3#fn5

ET - One memo - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976 Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 81

81. Memorandum From Edwin Truman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors Staff to the Chairman of the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors (Burns)1

  • SUBJECT
  • Under Secretary Bennett on the Discussions of Gold in Martinique
At the International Monetary Group meeting on December 17, attended by Governor Wallich, R. Solomon and me, Under Secretary Bennett gave a report on, and an interpretation of, the discussion of gold issues with the French in Martinique.

1. Purpose of the discussions
a. No effort was made to tie down an agreement on gold.
b. Any attempt to reach an agreement was left until January.

2. Valuation of gold holdings
a. The French intend to revalue their gold holdings on January 1, 1975, although they have not told their European colleagues yet. The French will neutralize the profits.
b. The United States does not intend to revalue its gold holdings at this time because Congress would want to spend the profits.
c. In Bennett's view, the agreement in Martinique on this aspect of gold is consistent with the understandings reached last summer—with respect to gold collateral loans.

3. Other aspects of the gold question
a. The French were reported to be in favor of the elimination from the I.M.F. Articles of the official price for gold.
b. The French were reported to be in favor of the elimination from the I.M.F. Articles of the mandatory provisions concerning gold.
c. The French were reported not to be in favor of the removal from the I.M.F. Articles of all mention of gold.
d. The French continue to oppose the sale on the market of the I.M.F.'s gold, although they might favor a "return of such gold to the shareholders."
e. The French continue to want to remove all restrictions on gold forthwith. On this point, Bennett reported that the U.S. representatives had agreed with the French view for the long run. During a transitional period, the U.S. representatives said, certain safeguards were necessary:
  • (1) There should be a limit on how much gold a country could buy net from the market; of course, a country could buy back any gold that it had sold to the market. In other words, the limit would apply to how much countries could add to their present stocks of gold.
  • (2) There should be no cartel agreement to fix the price of gold.
4. The next steps
a. In Bennett's view the French indicated that they might be prepared to reach a "full agreement" on gold in January, although the thrust of the agreement would be against their basic philosophy. They are particularly concerned with the problems that would be presented because they would have to go before the legislative committee chaired by M. Couve de Murville.2
b. It was suggested that agreement might be reached in which all (major) countries participated with the exception of France. Such an approach would follow the model of the 1968 Washington Arrangements on gold.3
c. The French view is that if no comprehensive agreement can be reached on gold, then all the options must be left open. Bennett admitted that the French might still cling to the view that gold should be a monetary asset.
d. In Bennett's view the United States should favor more than the elimination from the I.M.F. Articles of the official price and mandatory provisions concerning gold. He said that the French had indicated that "we can work out transitional arrangements" consistent with the U.S. view on the role of gold in the long run.
Comment
It was not clear at the end of Bennett's report, whether or not the United States favored pushing toward a "comprehensive agreement" on gold at this time. It was also not clear whether or not the United States would favor a less than comprehensive agreement. Several participants in the International Monetary Group meeting expressed concern about an agreement in which the official gold price and mandatory provisions governing gold were removed from the I.M.F. Articles but which left other options open. For example, if the I.M.F. could still accept gold in exchange for currencies or in payment of quota subscriptions, at what "price" would it accept such gold?
1 Source: Ford Library, Arthur Burns Papers, Federal Reserve Board Subject Files, Box B52, Gold, Sept.–Dec. 1974. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Wallich, Solomon, and Bryant.
2 Maurice Couve de Murville was head of the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee.
3 See footnote 5, Document 3.

Source: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d81

HSG - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976 Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 61

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1973–1976
Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 61


61. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Finance and Development (Weintraub) to the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker)1

Paul:
This is a paper which we prepared for Secretary Kissinger giving some of our views on the gold question. We discussed it at a meeting for his background,2 without attempting to reach any conclusions. We would appreciate any reactions you have to the paper. The Secretary said he would most appreciate meeting with you and anybody else you wish to designate in about two weeks to talk out the issue and what might be done, using a revised options paper for this purpose.
One option that is not included in the paper, but which should be for various reasons, is how to deal with thwarting the Europeans if they were to go ahead without us in a way which we felt was inimical to our interests.
Sid
Attachment3
GOLD AND THE MONETARY SYSTEM:POTENTIAL U.S.–EC CONFLICT
Summary

The Foreign Policy Context
Within the next few months the long-standing U.S.-European dispute on the role of gold will probably be propelled from the back room to the main stage of our relationship. The stakes in this dispute are high, involving the long-run stability of the international monetary system and prospects for increased dissension within Europe and between Europe and the U.S.

The Problem
U.S. objectives for the world monetary system—a durable, stable system, with the SDR as a strong reserve asset at its center—are incompatible with a continued important role for gold as a reserve asset. These objectives are in apparent conflict with the EC desire to facilitate the use of gold in international transactions. There is a belief among certain Europeans that a higher price of gold for settlement purposes would facilitate financing of oil imports, although the argument depends on assumptions regarding producers' attitude towards gold as an asset which may not be valid. Adamant U.S. insistence on maintaining the present fixed official price is likely to create international conflict with the EC, and may also lead to unilateral EC arrangements which would defeat our aims for the system.

The Conclusion
The U.S. objectives are important, and should not be given up, but they may be achievable without rigid adherence to the present fixed official gold price. Compromise proposals exist which would make adequate progress towards our objectives for the system while meeting principal EC needs. Since the EC is likely to set forth its proposals before the C–20 winds up its existence this summer, a U.S. position will be needed within the next several months. Tactically, it may also be preferable to discuss possible compromise proposals with one or more EC members before we are confronted with an EC position.
Pressures are building within the EC for settlement of intra-EC balances with gold valued at the market price (or some other price substantially higher than the current official price of $42.20 per troy ounce). Unilateral EC action in this direction would run directly counter to the stated United States position on international gold policy. The EC reportedly will try to avoid a direct conflict through pressing for rapid resolution of the problem within the framework of the multilateral monetary reform negotiations. Therefore, the U.S. position needs to be re-examined in light of present circumstances. This memorandum examines the foundations of this potential U.S.–EC conflict on the gold question, and considers which negotiating positions among various options would best serve U.S. interests.

Gold in the International Monetary System—The Issues
Agreement has been reached in the C–20 monetary reform negotiations that the SDR should take the place once held by gold at the center of the world monetary system. However, there is still substantial disagreement on what the exact future role of gold should be—whether it eventually ought to be phased out of the system (the U.S. view) or retain an important function as a reserve asset and means of international settlement (the position of some European countries).
U.S. interests in this question are in the establishment of stable, durable world monetary system, based on a strong SDR, which would avoid future monetary crises and conflict, such as those that have plagued the Bretton Woods system in recent years. In our view a system which included gold as a major reserve asset alongside SDRs would be inherently unstable, just as bimetallism was in the U.S.
This inherent instability stems from the fact that gold is traded as a commodity on a private market at a variable price subject to the vagaries of world production (largely Soviet and South African) and sales, and of demands by hoarders and speculators. With a fluctuating, and generally rising, free market for gold, a permanently fixed official price is simply not credible, and becomes less so as the gap between private and official prices widens. If, however, the price at which official transactions in gold are made were to be periodically adjusted to the market price, then an unstable situation would rise as between gold and SDRs.
At the present time, the value of the SDR is fixed in terms of gold. However, it has been generally agreed in the C–20 that the new SDR should not be related to gold, but rather to a basket of currencies. In this case, a changing price at which official gold transactions take place would create capital gains (or losses) for gold holders as compared to SDR holders, stimulate speculative central bank demand for gold, and weaken the SDR.4
It is the U.S. concern that any substantial increase now in the price at which official gold transactions are made would strengthen the position of gold in the system, and cripple the SDR. If international liquidity were injected via gold, there would be little likelihood of new SDR allocations.5 There also would be reduced incentive to sell gold on the private market even after an official price increase since central banks would cling to their gold in expectation of further official gold price increases. In addition, too large an increase in world liquidity might add to inflationary dangers. Finally, the distribution of the increase in world reserves would be highly inequitable, with eight wealthy countries getting three-fourths, while the developing countries would get less than 10 percent (see attached table). Producing countries (the USSR and South Africa) would benefit from the implicit floor put under the free-market gold price.
To encourage and facilitate the eventual demonetization of gold, our position is to keep the present gold price, maintain the present Bretton Woods agreement ban against official gold purchases at above the official price6 and encourage the gradual disposition of monetary gold through sales in the private market. An alternative route to demonetization could involve a substitution of SDRs for gold with the IMF, with the latter selling the gold gradually on the private market, and allocating the profits on such sales either to the original gold holders, or by other agreement.
European views on the role of gold in the world monetary system vary considerably. The British and Germans, on one hand, generally agree in principle to the desirability of phasing gold out of the system. On the other end of the spectrum, the French have been the main proponents of a continued important role for gold in the system.
Support for a continued role for gold in the system is based in large part on the belief that "paper gold"—the SDR—does not command sufficient confidence and acceptability to replace gold completely in the system. There is, in fact, still a considerable emotional attachment to gold as a monetary asset, and a basic distrust of bank or paper money not having intrinsic value.
On the other hand, most European officials recognize the basic problems involved in a combined SDR–gold reserve asset system. Belgian Finance Minister De Clerq,7 for example, speaking at the IMF annual meetings in September stated:
Any redefinition of the role of gold must be based on the principle stated above: that SDR must become the center of the system and that there can be no question of introducing a new form of gold– paper and gold–metal bimetallism, in which the SDR and gold would be in competition.
Despite these differences among member countries, the EC position has begun to coalesce around their desire to free gold for use in settling intra-EC debts—a problem raised by the present "immobilization" of gold which has resulted from the wide disparity between the official and free market gold prices. Monetary authorities have been unwilling to use their gold holdings to settle official debts at a price far below the free market price. This has been a problem particularly for the EC, whose rules under the "snake" arrangement require that final settlement of debts arising out of intervention to support intra-EC exchange rates must be made in reserve assets in proportion to the composition of reserve holdings. (This "immobility" is, of course, an example of the difficulties inherent in a system in which gold retains a reserve currency role alongside another reserve asset.)
To some extent, the immobility of gold reserves as a means of payment is a result of self-imposed restraints. Countries are free to use reserve currencies and SDRs to settle debts. Moreover, countries are now free to obtain additional currencies (and realize substantial capital gains) through sales of gold to the private market. The EC problem is a result of their particular rules for settlement, which reflect the interest of creditor countries in receiving gold and applying discipline to deficit countries. It is also a result of their reluctance, so far, to sell gold on the private market. The reasons for this reluctance are probably related to the unsettled status of gold in the system, the basic attraction of gold, the expectation of future price increases, and the "thinness" of the private gold market.
Nor is it clear that European countries would give up gold even after a price increase, since one increase may lead to an expectation of further increases. Even under the Bretton Woods system, the Europeans did not often give up gold to settle deficits.
The "immobility" problem is of particular concern to the French and Italians, who have substantial outstanding EC debts and especially high proportions of their reserve assets in gold. Recently, with the private price continuing to rise, and final decisions on monetary reform apparently further off than previously thought, other EC countries are coming around to the French-Italian view that this problem must be resolved. However, the Germans and British, in particular, are concerned that the solution be accomplished in a way which would not antagonize the United States. They wish to settle this issue in the C–20 multilateral context, if possible. Failing agreement there, the EC might feel free to unilaterally make some regional arrangement.
Various European proposals have been made to deal with the gold issue. The basic French proposal in the C–20 was simply to increase the official price of gold although this may have been made with tongue in cheek and received no support other than from South Africa. Other European proposals, and the stated French fallback position, have been variations on the idea that the official price of gold be abolished, leaving the SDR as the sole numeraire of the system, and that monetary authorities be free to deal at a negotiated price, or at a price related (perhaps at a discount) to the private market price. In the version reportedly recently proposed to the EC by the UK, such an arrangement would be combined with coordinated central bank sales to the private market. Another possibility reportedly being considered is to have the Italians, who have the greatest need, sell gold on the private market by themselves to avoid unduly depressing the market. The French version of this proposal would allow central banks either to buy or sell gold on the private market (obviously in order to avoid depressing the private market and to keep or augment the role of gold in the system).
In lieu of a general agreement permitting official transactions in gold at a price higher than the official price, some EC countries have proposed special arrangements to deal only with the intra-EC problem. Such proposals have heretofore been shelved by a combination of technical problems, and an unwillingness to take unilateral action of doubtful legality and offensive to the United States. Most recently, the EC Commission has proposed a system which would in effect set a higher provisional price, to be corrected when agreement is reached on a new price for gold.
Both the European C–20 proposal and the intra-EC proposals would fall short of a generalized increase in the official price of gold. However, each would amount to a generalized de facto, if not de jure,8 official price increase, and strengthen the role of gold in the system. A system of sales, but no purchases, to the private market would mitigate this tendency.
The recent oil price increases have added a new dimension to the gold issue, and in the view of some European officials, relegated the intra-EC problem to a secondary position. Although mobilization of gold for intra-EC settlement would help in the financing of imbalances among EC countries, it would not, of itself, provide resources for the financing of the anticipated deficit with the oil producers. For this purpose, it would be useful if the oil producers would invest some of their excess revenues in gold purchases from deficit EC countries at close to a market price. This would be an attractive proposal for European countries, and for the U.S., in that it would not involve future interest burdens and would avoid immediate problems arising from increased Arab ownership of European and American industry. (The Arabs could both sell the gold and use the proceeds for direct investment, so that the industry ownership problem would not be completely solved.) From the Arab point of view such an asset would have the advantages of being protected from exchange-rate changes and inflation, and subject to absolute national control. Some European officials are thinking in terms of clearing the way for such transactions (which would now be forbidden by IMF rules). It has been argued that Arabs would only be interested in buying gold at near the market price if they could obtain assurances of some sort of floor price. We have received word that such a proposal is being floated within the German Government.
From the standpoint of international liquidity needs, a reasonable case can now be made for a generalized gold price increase, since the probable payments patterns stemming from the higher oil prices (overall deficits for Europe and Japan) may lead to a reduction in world reserve liquidity. However, from the U.S. viewpoint (as well as many countries without large gold holdings) substantial new SDR allocations would be preferable when new liquidity creation is needed.
Options for U.S. Negotiating Policy on Gold
Since the U.S. is likely to be presented with pressure to acquiesce in some arrangements to meet the European objectives sketched out above, it is important that we reconsider what our own negotiating posture should be.
At either end of the spectrum of possible negotiating positions are the following:
Option 1: Continue adamant opposition to any proposal involving an increase in price at which monetary authorities carry out transactions in gold. Advantages: If successful, we will keep gold from regaining strength as an international reserve asset, maintain the strength of the SDR, and probably eventually obtain the demonetization of gold and a more rational, stable international monetary system. Disadvantages: The EC may then go ahead with its own arrangements which would amount to a virtual de facto increase in the official gold price, with undesirable effects on the world monetary system and lead to increased U.S.–EC conflict and bitterness.
Option 2: Acquiesce in a European-type plan involving abolition of the official price, permitting settlement of official balances at a negotiated price, with a "sales only" rule for transactions in the private market. Advantages: This would be somewhat preferable to a plan involving an outright increase in the official price, and would maintain an avenue for demonetization through one-way sales to the private market. The SDR would become the sole numeraire of the system. In the short run, tensions with Europe over monetary issues would be reduced. The increase in de facto liquidity might be helpful in present circumstances, and gold sales to the Arabs might help finance western balance of payments deficits. Disadvantages: This has most of the disadvantages discussed above of (and may in fact lead to) an outright increase in the official price of gold. We may thereby lose the opportunity to build a stable and rational world monetary system, with adverse long-term consequences involving monetary instability and conflict.
The disadvantages to each of these options are such that a search for additional options is justified. Intermediate options do exist which have the potential of meeting EC objectives of mobilizing gold in the short run, while maintaining the desirable trend towards gold demonetization.
Option 3: Complete short-term demonetization of gold through an IMF substitution facility. Countries could give up their gold holdings to the IMF in exchange for SDRs. The gold could then be sold gradually, over time, by the IMF to the private market. Profits from the gold sales could be distributed in part to the original holders of the gold, allowing them to realize at least part of the capital gains, while part of the profits could be utilized for other purposes, such as aid to LDCs. Advantages: This would achieve our goal of demonetization and relieve the problem of gold immobility, since the SDRs received in exchange could be used for settlement with no fear of foregoing capital gains.9 Disadvantages: This might be a more rapid demonetization than several countries would accept. There would be no benefit from the viewpoint of financing oil imports with gold sales to Arabs (although it is not necessarily incompatible with such an arrangement).
The only important disadvantage of option 3 would be its likely unacceptability to countries who would prefer to cling to gold for traditional reasons. But it would show our sensitivity to the immobility problem, and be a good initial bargaining position. We might, in the end, have to fall back on a fourth option:
Option 4: Accept a European-type arrangement in which the official gold price was abolished, and official transactions at a market-related price were permitted, but with agreement that a certain portion of gold be given up to an IMF substitution facility, and that gradual further substitution of SDRs for gold would take place over a longer period of time. (One possible rule among many could be that countries should keep the nominal value of their gold holdings fixed at present levels with any increases in value coming from price increases offset by substitutions. Another variant on this proposal would have countries agree to pre-determined, gradual direct sales to the private market. Again, profits could be shared between gold holders and others. Advantages: This would provide adequate momentum towards gold demonetization while providing relief to gold immobility problems. It seems somewhat more compatible with gold sales to the Arabs, if this is desirable. It may be negotiable. Disadvantages: It is somewhat less desirable for the medium-term workings of the system than option 3.
Conclusions
The U.S. objectives in reducing the role of gold in the world monetary system are worthwhile, but they may be achievable without insisting on adherence to the present fixed official price of gold. Moreover, such a stand might unnecessarily create international friction. Compromise proposals exist which have good prospects for achieving our objectives for the system while meeting the principal EC requirements. We should be prepared to use these compromises in the near future.
Tactics
Negotiation in a broader IMF forum is likely to be a very divisive and contentious process unless based on a prior U.S.-European understanding. The Europeans, however, are not united, although working on a common substantive position. We could wait for this position to develop further or proceed now with bilateral contacts with one or more EC members. Our waiting to be confronted with the EC position puts the French in a strong position through their veto over any departure from the agreed EC line. The gold issue would be an appropriate one to pursue in bilateral contacts with the Germans and British, both of whom could probably agree to options involving more modest flex in our traditional position than the French or Italians want. But there is, of course, no guarantee that the British and/or Germans could carry the resulting compromise in Brussels. Nevertheless, working out a compromise with some of the major Europeans could reduce the prospects for a U.S.–EC standoff, while leaving a substantial intra-EC disagreement to be bridged by the Europeans.
1 Source: National Archives, RG 56, Office of the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Files of Under Secretary Volcker, 1969–1974, Accession 56–79–15, Box 1, Gold—8/15/71–2/9/72. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the note reads: "Noted by Mr. Volcker." Another notation, dated March 8, indicates that copies were sent to Bennett and Cross.
2 The paper was discussed with Kissinger at a Department of State staff meeting on March 6. The summary attached to the front page of the meeting's minutes notes that Kissinger decided: "That a small State–Treasury group, to include Volcker be assembled to refine the choices in the EB paper and report back in two weeks. The revised paper should include the options of possible unilateral EC action vis-à-vis gold prices and in relation to oil import costs as well as US responses to abort or penalize such action (EB action)." (Ibid., RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger's Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 2, Secretary's Staff Meeting, March 6, 1974)
3 Confidential.
4 If a fixed SDR–gold price were to be maintained, and periodic free-market related adjustments in the official prices of gold were to be made, then the currency value of the world's primary reserve assets would be tied to a price set on a volatile, unstable market. [Footnote is in the original.]
5 As can be seen from the table at the end of this memorandum, official gold reserves are now valued at $43 billion at the $42.20 per ounce price. The free market price is almost four times the official price. [Footnote is in the original. The table is attached but not printed.]
6 The French have stated that they do not consider the IMF Articles as binding under present circumstances (the U.S. having suspended its convertibility obligation). We consider the Articles still binding. Other countries have not yet taken a position. [Footnote is in the original.]
7 Willy de Clercq was the Belgian Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister.
8 Under the present IMF Articles of Agreement, a generalized gold price increase (uniform par value change) would require approval of countries representing 85% of the IMF weighted voting power. Thus we have the power to block any legal change. [Footnote is in the original.]
9 The additional SDRs might be quite acceptable since, for a time at least, they would be "backed" by IMF gold holdings. Some gold "backing" could be maintained until prejudices against paper money waned—in a manner similar to the evolution of domestic monies. [Footnote is in the original.]

Source: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v31/d61