Philipp Hildebrand: Reflections on the gold marketSpeech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the LBMA Conference, Montreux, 26 June 2006.
Source: http://www.bis.org/review/r060706f.pdf?frames=0
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
BIS - Antonio Fazio: The relationships between currencies and gold
Antonio Fazio: The relationships between currencies and gold
Speech by Mr. Antonio Fazio, Governor of the Bank of Italy, at the World Gold Council International
Conference “The Euro, the Dollar and Gold”, held in Rome on 17 November 2000.
Source: http://www.bis.org/review/r001201b.pdf?frames=0
Speech by Mr. Antonio Fazio, Governor of the Bank of Italy, at the World Gold Council International
Conference “The Euro, the Dollar and Gold”, held in Rome on 17 November 2000.
Source: http://www.bis.org/review/r001201b.pdf?frames=0
Tuesday, August 21, 2012
Friday, August 17, 2012
EUI - Economic Policy Page Archive
Euro
Economic Sources
|
Economic
Policies in EMU
|
Source: ttp://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/Eurohomepage/Archive/policiesarchive.shtml
Tuesday, August 7, 2012
IM - THE ASCENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AS AN ACTOR IN THE MONETARY INTEGRATION PROCESS IN THE 1960s
Ivo Maes, 2 November 2004
"This paper discusses macroeconomic and monetary policy-making at the European Commission in the 1960s. The Commission, in its analysis, focussed strongly on economic imbalances in the Community, as they could threaten the common market project. In order to strengthen the system of economic governance of the Community, the Commission advocated an improved monetary cooperation, in line with the internal logic of the integration process. This contrasted with the view of the central bankers, who took the international monetary system as the framework for their analysis. The paper shows the ascent of the Commission as an actor in the monetary area, notwithstanding the relatively limited provisions of the EEC Treaty..."
Source: http://aei.pitt.edu/3009/1/MMTEC60art.pdf
"This paper discusses macroeconomic and monetary policy-making at the European Commission in the 1960s. The Commission, in its analysis, focussed strongly on economic imbalances in the Community, as they could threaten the common market project. In order to strengthen the system of economic governance of the Community, the Commission advocated an improved monetary cooperation, in line with the internal logic of the integration process. This contrasted with the view of the central bankers, who took the international monetary system as the framework for their analysis. The paper shows the ascent of the Commission as an actor in the monetary area, notwithstanding the relatively limited provisions of the EEC Treaty..."
Source: http://aei.pitt.edu/3009/1/MMTEC60art.pdf
AL - The evolution of Alexandre Lamfalussy´s thought on the international and European monetary system (1961 - 1993)
The evolution of Alexandre Lamfalussy´s thought on the international and European monetary system (1961 - 1993)
November 2011
National Bank of Belgium
"The establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), the predecessor of the European Central Bank, on 1 January 1994, was a milestone in the process of European monetary integration. In this paper, we look at the work on the international and European monetary system of Alexandre Lamfalussy, its first president. Lamfalussy pursued a threefold career: as a private banker, a central banker and an academic. Partly under the influence of Robert Triffin, Lamfalussy soon became interested in international monetary issues. This paper analyses his views on the international monetary system and on European monetary integration, including his contributions to the Delors Report, which provided the framework for European monetary union. The paper draws extensively on archival research in the Lamfalussy papers at the Bank for International Settlements and the minutes of the EEC Committee of Governors' meetings. The paper provides not only an analysis of Lamfalussy's thought on European monetary integration, but also offers crucial insight into the Weltanschauung and way of thinking of European central bankers in this period...."
...
"During his time at the Banque de Bruxelles, Lamfalussy's research interests shifted to monetary and financial issues, both national and international. He was intellectually close to the Radcliffe Report (see Lamfalussy 1961b). In the 1963-1965 period, he was a member of the Segré Committee, appointed by the European Commission, which investigated the integration of the capital markets in the EEC (CEC, 1966). The Segré Report underlined the linkages between freedom of capital movements and progress in other areas, such as monetary and economic policies. He also participated in meetings of several groups on the reform of the international monetary system, one of he most famous being the Bellagio group together with, among others, Sir Roy Harrod, Harry Johnson, Peter Kenen, Fritz Machlup, Robert Mundell, Jacques Rueff, Robert Triffin, Tibor Scitovsky and Pierre Uri 3. In the early 1970s, Alexandre Lamfalussy was a member of the so-called "Group of Rome" (see Lamfalussy et al., 1974). In the mid-1970s, he was a member of the "Villa Pamphili group", which produced a report on monetary arrangements in the European Common Market (Balassa, 1976)..."
Source: http://www.nbb.be/doc/oc/repec/reswpp/wp217En.pdf
[Mrt: The pause was due to my long holiday in South.]
November 2011
National Bank of Belgium
"The establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI), the predecessor of the European Central Bank, on 1 January 1994, was a milestone in the process of European monetary integration. In this paper, we look at the work on the international and European monetary system of Alexandre Lamfalussy, its first president. Lamfalussy pursued a threefold career: as a private banker, a central banker and an academic. Partly under the influence of Robert Triffin, Lamfalussy soon became interested in international monetary issues. This paper analyses his views on the international monetary system and on European monetary integration, including his contributions to the Delors Report, which provided the framework for European monetary union. The paper draws extensively on archival research in the Lamfalussy papers at the Bank for International Settlements and the minutes of the EEC Committee of Governors' meetings. The paper provides not only an analysis of Lamfalussy's thought on European monetary integration, but also offers crucial insight into the Weltanschauung and way of thinking of European central bankers in this period...."
...
"During his time at the Banque de Bruxelles, Lamfalussy's research interests shifted to monetary and financial issues, both national and international. He was intellectually close to the Radcliffe Report (see Lamfalussy 1961b). In the 1963-1965 period, he was a member of the Segré Committee, appointed by the European Commission, which investigated the integration of the capital markets in the EEC (CEC, 1966). The Segré Report underlined the linkages between freedom of capital movements and progress in other areas, such as monetary and economic policies. He also participated in meetings of several groups on the reform of the international monetary system, one of he most famous being the Bellagio group together with, among others, Sir Roy Harrod, Harry Johnson, Peter Kenen, Fritz Machlup, Robert Mundell, Jacques Rueff, Robert Triffin, Tibor Scitovsky and Pierre Uri 3. In the early 1970s, Alexandre Lamfalussy was a member of the so-called "Group of Rome" (see Lamfalussy et al., 1974). In the mid-1970s, he was a member of the "Villa Pamphili group", which produced a report on monetary arrangements in the European Common Market (Balassa, 1976)..."
Source: http://www.nbb.be/doc/oc/repec/reswpp/wp217En.pdf
[Mrt: The pause was due to my long holiday in South.]
Tuesday, May 15, 2012
Thursday, May 3, 2012
Tuesday, May 1, 2012
gwu - INterview with Yusuku Kashiwagi, 1996
Yusuku Kashiwagi Oral History Interview
Conducted by Makoto Iokibe,
Masayuki Tadokoro (National Defense University, Japan)
and
Yoshiko Kojo (University of Tokyo)
February 29, 1996
Tadokoro: When the protection of the dollar became a problem in the latter half of the 1960s, was there an effort to link it with the protection of Japan's security?
Kashiwagi: I never had anything to do with the security issue.
Tadokoro: For example, in Germany's case, in 1967, Breshing and Martin used the burden of U.S. protection as a reason for formally telling the U.S. that Germany would not exchange its dollar balance for gold. Did America try to get Japan to do anything similar to that?
Kashiwagi: I was in the embassy from 1958 to 1961 and....
Tadokoro: The embassy in America, right?
Kashiwagi: At that time, Japan had finally begun to obtain foreign currency reserves. The director general of the International Finance Bureau at the time recommended that because Japan had few gold reserves and because that fact could become a problem, Japan should obtain gold reserves. From that point, we slowly began to buy gold. Soon thereafter, I was at a party at the embassy and someone from the U.S. Department of the Treasury came up and said, "Mister Kashiwagi, it seems that Japan has been buying gold, do you need a loan from the World Bank or the U.S. EX-IM Bank?" It was a bald threat.
Tadokoro: So he meant that if you were going to do something as unnecessary as buying gold...?
Kashiwagi: If you want to call it that... he basically wanted an arrangement where Japan borrowed U.S. dollars to buy gold. You see, before the security protection guarantee by the U.S., Japan couldn't have bought gold. Japan had tried to figure out how to secretly buy it, but the U.S. had raised a fuss about it and Japan could have bought it anyway. In Japan, civilians were buying gold. They bought gold bars and gold coins. The government, however, still hadn't bought much.
Tadokoro: So the gold reserves were very small then?
Kashiwagi: Japan did not make any commitment that it would cheat on its security relations with the U.S. by trying to buy gold. It just tried to bring as much foreign capital into the country as possible and make the best of the World Bank and EX-IM Bank loans. Also, the real state of affairs was that while it was increasing its debt, Japan did not have the means to buy gold.
Tadokoro: Before the Nixon shock, what kind of forecast had you made regarding the appreciation of the yen?
Source: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/kashiwagiohinterview.htm
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